The Bronx is burning a hole in my pocket : why gentrification may never come (and what might happen to lenders, landlords, renters & buildings instead.) by Gelman, Emmaia
The Bronx is burning a hole in my pocket: 
Why gentrification may never come (and what might happen to 
lenders, landlords, renters & buildings instead.) 
 
By 
 
Emmaia Gelman 
 
Bachelor of Arts 
Columbia University, 1997. 
 
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIES AND 
PLANNING IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
DEGREE OF: 
 
MASTER IN CITY PLANNING 
AT THE 
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
JUNE 2007 
 
© 2007 Emmaia Gelman. All rights reserved. 
 
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce 
and to distribute publicly paper and electronic 
copies of this thesis document in whole or in part 
in any medium now known or hereafter created. 
 
 
Signature of Author: _____________________________________________________ 
Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
May 24, 2007 
 
Certified by: ____________________________________________________________ 
Langley Keyes 
Ford Professor of City and Regional Planning 
Thesis Advisor 
 
Accepted by: ___________________________________________________________ 
Langley C. Keyes 
Ford Professor of City and Regional Planning 
Chair, MCP Committee 
 
The Bronx is burning a hole in my pocket: 
Why gentrification may never come (and what might happen to lenders, 
landlords, renters & buildings instead.) 
 
By 
 
Emmaia Gelman 
 
Bachelor of Arts 
Columbia University, 1997. 
 
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIES AND PLANNING 
ON MAY 24, 2007 
 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER IN CITY PLANNING 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Bronx buildings appear to face a split possibility for their future: gentrification, as the city housing 
market continues to tighten; or abandonment, as inflated prices come down and leave owners in the 
red. This thesis takes stock of the buildings, the players and regulation, and looks at what could 
happen and what should be happening in order for Bronx communities to build the capacity to plan 
for the future of the housing stock. In light of the new Bronx environment, the means of preserving 
and regulating housing stock necessarily look different than before. They demand a more 
comprehensive approach to regulation that reaches investors as well as physical buildings. They 
demand a physical monitoring system that doesn’t bank on tenants to report or landlords to self-
certify, and that recognizes the social constraints on landlords and tenants as actors. Many of these 
gaps are bridged by community groups that can function as regulatory aides, advocates for both 
housing stock and property viability, and on-the-ground analysts of the shifting markets that co-
regulate Bronx buildings. 
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New York Magazine’s 2003 Neighborhood Map… edited to 
show the Bronx, which didn’t rate a mention. 
 
nymag.com/realestate/articles/03/realestate2003/neighborhood_map.htm 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Bronx is off the radar for many New Yorkers, an unknown borough where the streets 
are numbered so high that a downtown-dweller might get a nosebleed. Although 1.36 million New 
Yorkers live in the Bronx (about 17% of the whole city) it’s not at all unusual to find a lifelong 
resident of some other borough who’s never been there; or been only for a Yankees game; or just 
driven through it on the way upstate. It sits at the northern end of Manhattan; on the other side of it 
are suburban Westchester and, shortly north of 
that, Connecticut. The Bronx itself is a big 
chunk of former farmland, now dotted with 
industrial sites and a mix of cityscapes ranging 
from endless blocks of big buildings to Archie 
Bunker-style houses to mansions on the 
forested cliffs of Riverdale (sometimes 
described as “not really the Bronx.”) 
Although the Bronx has a few major 
shopping streets, the city’s Zoo and an 
elaborate Botanical Garden, its charms don’t 
draw crowds. Its clubs have incubated hip-hop 
and salsa groups that later went international, 
and its museums and theaters workshop artists 
who are truly up-and-coming – but rather than 
becoming a cultural destination, the Bronx seems to have acted as a breeding ground for ideas and 
forms that only get a larger audience when they leave. Heavily residential, and populated more by 
 6 
dense family networks, organic/experimental cultural institutions and industry than commerce, the 
Bronx is still a hometown rather than a destination. 
For a long time, the central neighborhoods of the Bronx have been heavily settled by 
newcomers and their subsequent generations – first Irish, Italians and Jews, then Puerto Ricans, then 
African-Americans migrating from the South. After the mid-1960s many others were pushed there 
specifically by poverty. But the housing was built before the war in a fevered rush of development, 
as Manhattan became more crowded and both public transportation and roads extended north in 
the Bronx. The new buildings were the large, solid apartments buildings that now characterize many 
neighborhoods. Although the original tenants were not rich, the buildings were grand.1 
The Bronx suffered a long period of decay and abandonment beginning in the 1970s, and 
then a long, drawn-out effort at revitalization that has lasted from the mid-1980s to the present.2 
The streets look and feel different than before. They’re cleaned regularly, the streetlamps mostly 
work, the subway stations are pretty safe, taxis pass by regularly and there are plenty of people 
around. The outward signs of the Bronx depression are erased from many streets. In their place, 
some neighborhoods are pulling in arty youth to live in converted warehouses, and some of the 
grand old buildings are going co-op, housing people who might once have looked for a place in 
downtown Chelsea.3 The city has targeted unprecedented amounts of city funding at commercial 
development. Yankee Stadium is being torn down and rebuilt about 100 yards to the north; the 
project has engendered plans for a general upscaling of the surrounding neighborhood and hopes 
that development will trickle deeper into the Bronx.4 Big things are happening. 
                                                
1 Jonnes, Jill. We’re Still Here (1986) 
2 Ibid. 
3 Neuman, W. “Outsiders Tiptoe Into the South Bronx” New York Times, January 15, 2006 
4 “Mayor Bloomberg, Governor Pataki and New York Yankees announce plans for area revitalization and 
new stadium in the South Bronx.” New York City Economic Development Corporation, June 15, 2005 
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The happenings are producing the usual conflict between the new wave of development and 
the people who already live there; between the well-funded newcomers and the poorer locals; the 
usual conflict over whether it’s better to improve a neighborhood even if some people are forced 
out, or to let it scrape along in the supposed doldrums. In a city where the gulf between rich and 
poor is yawning wider than ever, gentrification is a hot topic hotly contended. Real estate investors, 
galvanized by the city’s commitment to development, seem to have made up their minds that the 
Bronx is headed upward. Buildings are selling more often and for higher prices than ever before in 
the Bronx’s history. It’s a path that many New York neighborhoods have taken before – which 
makes the familiar march of gentrification seem unstoppable. 
But as in other things, the Bronx is different. The tenants of the Bronx are not the same as 
tenants who have been forced out of other neighborhoods: for one thing, they’re poorer and have 
fewer places to go. The landlords of the Bronx aren’t the same either. Increasingly, they’re distant 
investors who are disconnected from the realities of the neighborhoods they’re buying up. And the 
buildings aren’t the same. They carry both their grandeur and their specific history of neglect, which 
makes them both appealing and more vulnerable than other pools of New York housing stock. 
Add to these conditions the fact that city agencies don’t have much regulatory leverage over 
privately-held buildings, and it seems possible that the landlords who aren’t in physical contact with 
their buildings may not see the urgency of repairing them; and that poor tenants can neither demand 
repairs nor leave. It seems possible that, while landlords await gentrification that increases the real 
value of their buildings and supports reinvestment, the buildings may reach a crisis that threatens 
them both as property and as homes. Given that, already, few options exist for rehousing low 
income people, and that Bronx buildings house around 15% of the city’s poor,5 the Bronx housing 
                                                
5 Approximation based on calculations of Bronx poverty rate and NYC poverty rate from US Census data 
and (for subtracting public housing population) public housing unit distribution data from the NYC Housing 
Authority Fact Sheet. 
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landscape shows the makings of a housing crisis, a class conflict and a hard fall for some – if not all 
– of its players. 
Although it’s essential to know what’s happening to housing stock, though, a housing market 
filled with private actors and private property is difficult to gauge. Which urban beast is waiting in 
the wings – abandonment or gentrification? Or is this a new kind of conflict rooted in new 
phenomena: regional population growth that’s reached a critical point, wealth disparities that make 
people act in different, new ways? Are the buildings really racing toward crisis? Are the investors 
taking on buildings bearing the scars of decline prepared to shore them up after all? Will regulators 
step in to ensure the buildings’ survival? Or will the poor tenants just move on in time? 
This thesis looks into the somewhat uncharted ecology of landlords, tenants, community 
groups, regulators and mortgage-lenders to understand what’s happening to Bronx housing stock, 
whether gentrification is really in the cards, and what the Bronx’s future might otherwise look like. 
An understanding of this ecology should be the basis for thinking about interventions to reorder it, so 
that the city and its communities can do real planning for the future of housing as a public resource. 
 
What’s  ahead 
Chapter 1 sets the stage: New York City is an extremely tight housing market pushing low-
income residents from Manhattan and its proximal neighborhoods – neighborhoods described by 
Mayor Bloomberg as “a luxury product” – into outer areas that are already full of poor tenants. The 
more people who arrive in New York City, the more middle- to upper-income people are viewing 
the poor neighborhoods as desirable too. Developers and landlords are banking on neighborhoods 
to gentrify, rents to rise, and poor people to move further on. But gentrification has been on the 
march in New York City for too long, and the Bronx is already housing of last resort for tenants 
pushed out of other formerly-poor areas. In other gentrifying neighborhoods, tenants have been 
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displaced to further-outlying neighborhoods – in some, like Palo Alto, they were pushed all the way 
to other cities while they struggled to hold onto jobs in the central node. But New York’s suburban 
cities are in crisis too, and Bronx low-income tenants have nowhere left to go. As a result, buildings 
largely populated by low-income tenants become pawns in the struggle over who will occupy 
neighborhoods. 
As poor tenants’ need to stay increases, the importance of keeping their apartments in livable 
condition increases too – but in the absence of alternative housing, so does their tolerance for bad 
conditions. Meanwhile, many landlords are waiting for their poorer tenants to leave, waiting for 
higher rents to support deep repairs or deliberately pursuing “selective disrepair” to encourage 
tenants out.  
Chapter 2 digs further back into the history of the Bronx, to identify the history of both the 
people and the buildings. Although the buildings were solidly made, the distress they suffered during 
the “Bronx depression” still affects them now. And although the Bronx doesn’t currently look like 
it’s facing abandonment – quite the opposite – it hold echoes of neighborhoods abandoned in the 
1970s: over-leveraged buildings, rent rolls that barely support operating costs, the failure of 
regulatory enforcement, paper investors for whom real-world buildings hold little interest, tenants 
who are overly tolerant of decay. Is the Bronx’s slow emergence from depression really leading it to 
gentrification? Or, like the Bronx of the 1970s, will that hope burn out while landlords wait for an 
upturn that’s too slow to come? 
Chapter 3 introduces three case studies to help answer these questions: three buildings that 
survived the depression with physical and social scars, and whose landlords and tenants have come 
to conflict over the future of the buildings by virtue of crises that threatened physically to destroy 
them. First, the tenants describe the range of approaches that they and their neighbors take to their 
apartments, and the many ways in which apartments have been leveraged by tenants who lack other 
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resources. To these tenants the buildings’ physical crises came as no surprise; they had been 
watching the decline progress from the inside, literally. Each one understood the decline and the 
neglect as deliberate on the part of their landlords, but dug in and refused to be moved. Then the 
tenants tell the stories of the physical building crises that threatened their tenancy – and of the 
organizing that dramatically increased their leverage over building quality. Each involves a 
breakdown of building operations, on a scale ranging from fairly small to quite enormous. So 
Chapter 4 looks as buildings, tenants, landlords and regulators to determine how they’re supposed to 
operate – and how they function instead. 
In Chapter 4, the regulations that are supposed to establish working relationships between 
landlords and tenants, and protect the housing stock, are set out. The regulations are intended to 
ensure that landlords’ projected uses for the buildings, like filling them with higher-paying 
gentrifiers, don’t force current tenants out; and to circumscribe tenant actions in ways that protects 
the buildings as landlords’ private property. They’re also intended to subject buildings to physical 
oversight from city agencies – in short, to preserve a balance between buildings both as a 
commodity with many stakeholders, and as a public resource. But the case studies, in combination 
with other data, provide a different picture of what actually happens – how tenants and landlords 
both use the regulatory system to leverage power over the buildings and their future uses; how their 
complicated identities often impede their ability to act in the interest of preserving buildings, and 
how regulators themselves lack the capacity to know what’s happening to buildings. And when the 
buildings are Bronx pre-war stock coming out of several decades of distress, the lack of controls on 
building quality produces – as in the case studies – existential crisis. 
In the wake of this finding, Chapter 5 looks at the other regulator of building quality, 
maintenance strategies and the future of Bronx housing stock: the market. Tenants appear to be 
hanging onto their apartments and hoping to stave off gentrification that would price them out, and 
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some landlords appear to be holding out for the same anticipated gentrification. But the market for 
buildings as real estate (rather than housing) has shifted dramatically in respond to US tax code 
changes and the local New York real estate environment, and the role of gentrification expectations 
in driving the market appears to be mercurial as well. While gentrification is “the story” that seems 
to be driving one set of investors, at least two other sets – larger real estate groups and current long-
term owners – aren’t necessarily convinced by it at all. The case studies are characterized by a 
landlord from each group, and this chapter looks at them and behind them, at their lenders. The 
resulting picture is of a market that fosters massive neglect of buildings among at least one type of 
investor/landlord, and which entirely outruns the regulatory system in terms of dictating building 
quality. For buildings that are already vulnerable because of their histories – which are 
disproportionately the buildings entering the new market – this problem poses an additional physical 
threat. 
Now that the players have each been investigated and pinned down, Chapter 6 looks at the 
evidence to project where this constellation of tenants, buildings, landlords, investors and regulators 
is headed. What happens if nobody blinks? A comparison of indicators from the case studies, data 
on a building that did partially collapse and a 1% sample of buildings recently sold on the Bronx 
market demonstrates pervasive risk to buildings resulting from long-term neglect – but also an 
enormous gap in knowledge of buildings’ actual physical condition, not to mention enforcement. 
Even in light of recent advancements in the city’s enforcement capacity, faults in reporting 
mechanisms mean that Bronx buildings still seem to be at risk, and that risk continues to escalate 
over time. An accounting of the factors that might influence low-income tenants’ efforts to stay in 
their apartments turns up evidence that many can stay and can’t leave, even if buildings deteriorate. At 
the same time, landlords and investors seem to lack an understanding of the real circumstances or 
motivations of their tenants. They may also misjudge the condition of their buildings, and miss the 
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danger that their properties may decline to the point where they actually lose them. For some, this 
may mean they’ve miscalculated their debt burden and operating budget; for others who never 
intended to operate their buildings, it may mean nothing until the building comes to crisis. Either 
way, buildings as housing stock and as property are threatened; interventions are urgent. Fortunately, 
some community advocates are planning for them now. 
Chapter 7 takes stock of the nature of the risk to buildings, and looks again at what should 
be happening. In light of the new Bronx environment, the means of preserving and regulating 
housing stock necessarily look different than before. They demand a more comprehensive approach 
to regulation that reaches investors as well as physical buildings. They demand a physical monitoring 
system that doesn’t bank on tenants to report or landlords to self-certify, and that recognizes the 
social constraints on landlords and tenants as actors. Many of these gaps are bridged by community 
groups that can function as regulatory aides, advocates for both housing stock and property viability, 
and on-the-ground analysts of the shifting markets that co-regulate Bronx buildings.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
THE SQUEEZE: NEW YORK CITY TENANTS EDGE TOWARD THE BRONX 
 
Rental apartments are a scarce resource in New York City. It’s crowded – about 75,000 new 
residents arrive each year,6 and its apartments are shared by nearly 70% of the city’s population. 
Officially, that makes a total renter population of 5.74 million, not including undocumented 
immigrants, short-stayers and other numerous but uncounted New Yorkers. 7 The total unmet 
demand for housing in 2005 was estimated at about 100,000 units (co-op and condo construction 
that outpaces population growth is expected to ease some of that demand in the next few years, but 
renters will still face deepening scarcity)8 and the citywide vacancy rate is about 3%.9 So those 5.74 
million people are competing pretty urgently for apartments. 
If you’re a New Yorker who’s working, low-income or very-low income, you’re even more 
likely to be a renter. By the same token, your ability to compete for apartments, price-wise, is much 
smaller. The median New York City renter pays 31.2% of income for rent. But income disparities in 
New York City mean that the median renter is in very different circumstances than the poor renter. 
In fact, the renter at the 20th percentile earns only 1/6th of the 80th percentile renter’s income. 
Among the poor – 99.5% of whom are renters10 – the rent-to-income ratio is 50.4%.11 Those renters 
are competing with higher-strata renters who have, relatively, nearly limitless economic power.  
                                                
6 Approximation based on US Census data on New York City (Population, 2003 estimate; Population, 
percent change, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2003; Population, percent change, 1990 to 2000) 
7 Ibid. 
8 State of New York City’s Housing & Neighborhoods 2005. Furman Center for Real Estate, 2005.  
9 New York City Housing Vacancy Survey. NYC Dept. of Housing & Urban Development, 2005 
10 Ibid and NYC Housing & Vacancy Survey, U.S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics 
Division, 2005. 
11 Furman Center for Real Estate, 2005. Citywide data for wealth diversity ratios and rent-to-income ratios for  
low-income renters not receiving housing subsidies 
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A disproportionate number of those low-income renters live in the Bronx, and citywide 
housing pressures that squeeze low-income people propel even more renters toward the Bronx. Over 
the last decade, the pressure has increased as middle-income people are squeezed, too. Their 
trajectory has been toward the poor areas of Manhattan and onward to the outer boros and 
suburban cities. 
Accordingly, pressures on the Bronx may be predicted by an inter-neighborhood effect 
already underway within Manhattan. Since 1985, for-profit developers have been incentivized by New 
York State’s 421-a tax exemptions12 to produce new housing where 20% of the units are initially 
price-controlled for “affordability” – but only for up to 25 years, depending on the duration of the 
abatement, before they revert to market rate. While the tax break at first insulates the units as below-
market housing, it eventually releases a burst of high-priced apartments into a neighborhood. 
This “80/20” development was originally concentrated in wealthy Manhattan 
neighborhoods, using tax certificates from affordable units to support luxury development in 
response to growing demand.13 To the extent that some developers have included the 20% 
affordable units in the same buildings with the 80%, it has created temporarily affordable units even 
in neighborhoods where none would have otherwise existed. In poorer areas facing housing-driven 
gentrification, though, 80/20 development has added high-income units that help tip a 
neighborhood. In some cases they have helped raise prices throughout whole neighborhoods, 
forcing poor people out. Beginning in the early 2000s, as middle class people have been pushed 
deeper into low-income neighborhoods, developers have begun to concentrate 421-a construction in 
poor neighborhoods adjacent to wealthy ones to leverage this gentrifying effect. East Harlem offers 
                                                
12 421a exemptions provided varying returns to developers depending on location and proportion of 
affordable units. For 80/20 buildings, they provided a full exemption from property taxes for 20-25 years. 
“421-a Summary” (Fact Sheet). Pratt Center for Community Development, undated. 
(These rules have subsequently been amended, although not abolished.) 
13 HPD chart describing 2004 data, reprinted in Acitelli, Tom, “Murky future for 421a tax incentives worries 
developers, marketers” The Real Deal, April 2006. 
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a stark example.14 There, 80/20 buildings banked on luxury amenities – workout rooms, proximity 
to transportation, taller construction than the surrounding area which provides city views, etc. – and 
soon commanded post-gentrification rents. Steep demand for middle- and upper-income housing 
has sped up the process, as has the harder-to-document increase in acceptance by middle class 
people of housing in neighborhoods that are low-income and non-white.15 The neighborhood has 
been fundamentally shifted in the space of about five years.16 These same factors are driving a spate 
of conversions of formerly affordable or “bad”-neighborhood rental apartments to co-ops and 
condos. 
The Bronx is ripe for this treatment. It’s adjacent to northern Manhattan, where starting 
rents have already exceeded HUD’s Fair Market Rent calculation by almost 100%.17 High-income 
tenants are already anchoring there in existing housing stock, so it seems likely that newly-
constructed luxury apartments could draw more.18 421-a rules, recently revised, no longer recognize 
the Bronx as an area for low-income housing development, so building new low-income units in the 
Bronx no longer yields the tax break.19 Some community groups are rejecting the “dumping” of low-
income housing there, on the theory that the deliberate concentration of poor people in Bronx 
housing programs constitutes undevelopment.20 Bronx real estate investors are angling for a new set 
of tenants. 
                                                
14 Gabarine, Rachelle, “Residential Real Estate; 5 Market-Rate Rentals Planned for East Harlem” New York 
Times, May 31, 2002. 
15 While documentation is difficult, pop culture references to this phenomenon are abundant. Some include 
comedian Dave Chappelle’s “Chappelle’s Show” (Comedy Central TV network) and the blog 
www.angrybrownbutch.com (2/27/07 entry: “Hey white folks - it’s time to get really mad at me again!”) One tenant 
organizer interviewed for this research, Willia McKeiver, also cited the shift in race/class boundaries. 
16 Brozan, Nadine, “In East Harlem, Developers Find The Next Frontier” New York Times 8/29/04 
17 HUD’s 2006 Fair Market Rent=$1,133 for a two-bedroom apartment, while rents in Harlem are around 
$2000, according to Harlem developer Frank Anelante. 
18 Neuman, 1/15/06 
19 “Developers - Tax Incentives - 421-a.” NYC Dept. of Housing Preservation & Development, undated. 
20 See Oser, Alan “Churches as Builders; A Struggle Over Sites in the South Bronx” New York Times, Oct. 22, 
1989 (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE3DF1639F931A15753C1A96F948260 on 
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Although New York City has some plans to reduce citywide housing pressures, there are 
essentially no city subsidies for private development of permanently-designated low-income housing. 
(The closest approximation, city-administered, are Low Income Housing Tax Credits.) The city’s 
main housing plan, the New Housing Marketplace program which has successfully drawn for-profit 
developers into construction and rehab of subsidized units, aims to create 165,000 new units in the 
city by 2013. But few of these units are targeted at low-income residents: just a few hundred will be 
supportive housing, and the city’s definition of affordability is specific to middle-class earners. The 
plan is also focused disproportionately on homeownership, which is simply out of reach of almost 
all of the city’s low-wage workers and other poor people. Finally, the plan dovetails with the NYC 
[Public] Housing Authority’s efforts to turn vacant portions of NYCHA properties to higher-
yielding uses: the New Housing Marketplace plans to target NYCHA’s “underutilized” properties 
for development affordable to middle-class people.21 
Maybe more significantly, there’s no direct city support for making sure that the apartments 
where poor and working people live now stay affordable. New York City’s 1.7 million low-income 
tenants make the preservation of truly affordable housing stock an urgent matter. The number of 
New Yorkers with unserved needs for low-cost housing is also enormous, and less obvious because 
tenants who cannot afford even to seek housing are not necessarily counted by the market. Public 
housing has a 140,000-family waiting list that would require a 78% apartment turnover to 
accommodate,22 the city hosts 112,000 Section 8 vouchers23 and only 47,000 dedicated (project-
based) Section 8 units.24 About 45,000 people who are homeless for non-mental health reasons are 
                                                                                                                                                       
5/24/07); this question is the theme of informal conversations around many low-income development 
proposals.  
21 New York’s New Housing Marketplace. NYC Housing Development Corporation, 2002. 
22“Fact Sheet: About NYCHA.” New York City Housing Authority, undated. 
23 “Report of the Infrastructure Division to the Subcommittee on Public Housing.” New York City Council 
Subcommittee on Public Housing, May 25, 2004. 
24 Closing the Door: Accelerating Losses in New York City Subsidized Housing. Community Service Society, May 2006 
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housed in transitional shelters or standard homeless shelters.25 Additionally, the city is believed to 
host at least 650,000 undocumented immigrants;26 most of whom are low-income or very low-
income, and help make up the numbers of New York’s 150,000 doubled-up renter households.27 
The total number of people unserved at any moment is uncounted, but clearly it far exceeds the 
vacancy rate for low- and moderate-rent apartments. 
The enormous, unabated demand for housing citywide, and low-income housing in 
particular, focuses even greater pressure on the Bronx. Concentrated low-income renters there are 
pressed by renters being pushed out of other areas, but Bronx buildings are nonetheless viewed as 
“undeveloped” in terms of rent potential. The stress seems posed unavoidably to shift renters’ 
strategies for affording housing – from seeking out lower cost housing to hanging on ever more 
tightly to what they have. 
 
Battening down the hatches in the Bronx 
To date, most cities have found some equilibrium between housing and serving wealthier 
residents and poorer ones: either more housing has been made available, or poor tenants have found 
a way to move to cheaper housing within cities. But New York City, like a few other cities which 
may be “hitting the wall” of housing crisis, has the special problem of limitless demand: so many 
people want to live there, and economic disparities between the newcomers and current residents 
are so great, that there is effectively no brake on the transfer of housing units from low-income 
tenants to richer ones; and perhaps no brake on the geographic erosion of low-income 
                                                
25 Based on calculations using shelter data from Coalition for the Homeless and transitional housing data 
from New York State Consolidated Plan Federal Fiscal Years 2006 – 2010, Section 91.310(b)/Homeless Facilities, 
NYS Division of Housing and Community Renewal 
26 Census 2000 and Pew Research Report on Undocumented Immigrants as cited in Beveridge, Andrew 
“Undocumented Immigrants” Gotham Gazette, April 2006. 
27 The Need for Affordable Housing. HousingFirst!, undated. 
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neighborhoods. According to the NYC Department of City Planning’s population director, ''we may 
be reaching a point where the city's population gets to be so large you can't keep adding.”28 
These factors weigh especially heavily on Bronx residents. The Bronx is the landing place of 
a disproportionate number of New Yorkers who are at the margins of the housing market. Rents are 
orders of magnitude lower in the Bronx than in Manhattan (except in a few quasi-suburban 
neighborhoods), but the median low-income Bronx tenant making $27,500 per year still pays 52.4% 
of their income for rent,29 and about one-fifth of Bronx tenants pay more than 60%.30 More than 
40% of the City’s Section 8 vouchers are located in the Bronx,31 and in many Bronx neighborhoods 
Section 8 tenants alone occupy 30-45% or more of all units.32 The Bronx is also home to some of 
the highest levels of SSD recipients and HIV/AIDS Services Administration voucher tenants, both 
of whom are extremely limited in apartment choice by rent limits. And beyond the universe of 
subsidized housing, the Bronx is also the place where many very-low income New Yorkers finally 
fall over the edge. Between 1999 and 2003, almost a quarter of New Yorkers who entered the shelter 
system came from Bronx addresses.33 
Together, the housed and homeless poor of the Bronx make up 28.2% of the city’s 
population.34 The concentration of poor tenants there is not coincidental: their opportunity to live 
anywhere else is extraordinarily limited. Citywide, the median rent for an occupied apartment is 
$900; in the Bronx, it’s $775.35 To sign a new lease, though, is vastly more expensive. Worse, vacancy 
                                                
28 Robert, Sam, “Immigrants swell numbers in and near city.” New York Times 8/15/06 
29 State of New York City’s Housing & Neighborhoods 2006. Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006.  
30 State of New York City’s Housing & Neighborhoods 2004. Furman Center for Real Estate, 2004. Using 2002 data 
31 Ibid. 
32 Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006 
33 Based on tabulations from Smith, Nancy et al. Understanding Family Homelessness in New York City: An In-
Depth Study of Families’ Experiences Before and After Shelter. Vera Institute of Justice, September 2005 
34 US Census Data 
35 Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006 
 19 
rents for lower-rent apartments are even lower than for others: around 2% for apartments starting 
below $800.36 
Virtually no regulatory intervention mitigates the spiraling decline in access to apartments for 
poor and working people. Citywide, New York State rent regulations hold rent on most of the city’s 
1.04 million regulated apartments below market rates and sets a maximum allowable increase for 
lease renewals each year, but the price controls expire when an apartment reaches a rent of 
$2000/month and becomes vacant or is occupied by wealthy tenants.37 Ongoing renewal increases, 
20% rent increases at each vacancy and 1/40-of-cost increases to monthly rent for renovations 
diminish the supply of rent-regulated apartments. Many larger apartments with proportionally higher 
rents can be presumed to have reached deregulation already. Within the Bronx, rent stabilization 
laws tie low-income tenants to the apartments they already occupy.38 The 20% vacancy increase 
means that a vacated apartment is vastly more expensive than an occupied one, even within the 
universe of “affordable” apartments. The same factors increase the value to tenants of staying in 
their apartments. Not only is the Bronx the last frontier for people seeking affordable housing; it is 
the last frontier for many who already live there. Beyond New York City, suburban Yonkers and 
New Rochelle have become cities of last resort for poor people who are able to detach themselves 
from family and work structures in New York, although this resource too is in crisis. But for those 
who cannot afford to leave New York, there is nowhere else to go. 
                                                
36 New York City Housing Vacancy Survey. NYC HPD, 2005 
37 Wealth-based decontrol: if legal rent reaches $2000 during tenancy (instead of by vacancy increase) and the 
tenants had an annual household income of $250,000 or more for the preceding two years, the apartment 
becomes deregulated. As rents citywide move toward the $2000 mark, and housing pressures lead wealthier 
tenants to occupy apartments in poorer neighborhoods, this policy develops new implications for 
gentrification. 
38 Current rent stabilization rules produce at least a 20% vacancy increase in virtually all “typical, pre-war” 
Bronx apartments – while Bronx tenants’ capacity to pay does not increase at all. The 20% vacancy increase 
necessarily draws higher income tenants from other boros into the Bronx. This creates even deeper economic 
disadvantage for Bronx residents, and adds to population pressures that also contribute to scarcity of low-
income housing. 
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Fixing to stay 
Since tenants can’t afford to move, the availability of housing to low-income and working 
people is a factor not only of price-affordability, but of tenants’ ability to stay in their apartments 
over time. In other words, the current supply of housing available to poor and working people is 
artificial – meaning that some uncounted (but arguably large) number of units where poor and 
working people live are available to that population only because poor and working people are in 
them now. As tenants leave, these units are increasingly unavailable to other low-income tenants. So 
maintaining the habitability of the apartments in order for tenants to be able to stay in it is an 
important component of affordability. Housing laws mandating “habitability” theoretically protect 
tenants on this front. But in reality apartment problems often become incredibly burdensome, and 
tenants have historically used their ability to leave as a way to escape poor conditions. Since the 
ability to leave is circumscribed for many Bronx tenants, habitability is more critical than ever. 
The same factors that constrict tenants’ housing choices (and push landlords to pursue 
gentrification) now increase the value to landlords of losing tenants in their lower-income buildings. 
For landlords anticipating neighborhood change, creating long-term habitability for their current 
tenants interferes with developing vacancies and shifting the population. To that extent, the struggle 
over habitability issues has much bigger implications for affordable housing. 
Tenants have means at their disposal to fight: the regulatory/court system is one strategy. 
But just being there is another. Low-income tenants especially are figuring out how to leverage that 
presence in ways that don’t look like gentrification – and in ways that may surprise landlords. 
 
 The fate of tenants is generally the focus in examinations of increasing rents and market-
squeezing. In this case, though, landlords who are banking on gentrification may also find themselves 
in trouble. And because landlords may fight back by reducing habitability and tenants may fight back 
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by staying anyway, there’s another layer of risk: to the buildings. To understand what that risk may 
be, it’s critical to understand the past of the buildings themselves, and the neighborhoods that have 
shaped them.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE HISTORY: WHERE DO BRONXES COME FROM? 
 
Classic Bronx housing stock has a recognizable face: quasi-Art Deco brick buildings of five 
or six storeys; interiors laid with tile and hardwood floors; marble walls in the common spaces and 
molded plaster walls inside apartments; metal-and-marble fireproof stairs. The smaller buildings are 
laid out in a single riser, the larger versions in a butterfly plan with a courtyard between the wings. In 
New York tenant parlance, the buildings are simply “pre-war.” Most were constructed between 1904 
and 1941,39 and the majority are approaching their hundredth year. The Bronx’s pre-war building 
stock comprises about 37% of its total units,40 and much more of its low-income housing. So those 
buildings are the focus of this research.  
The same buildings in Manhattan command high rents, in part because of their stateliness. 
But the history of pre-war buildings in the Bronx makes them much less desirable. In fact, although 
the buildings are similar to Manhattan’s most glamorous old housing stock, most New Yorkers’ 
sense of the Bronx does not currently include “beautiful buildings” at all. 
The earlier history of the buildings matches their architectural luxury. But as a class, they fell 
into disrepair during the 1970s Bronx depression. While some neighborhoods were spared, many 
North Bronx areas and virtually all South Bronx neighborhoods were swept into the decline.41  
The Bronx’s depression mirrored the abandonment, spurred by suburbanization and the 
energy crisis, of other inner cities. Outmigration of more affluent city residents left city 
neighborhoods with poorer tenants, shrinking rent rolls to support repairs and rising fuel costs, and 
diminishing populations to demand city services. Live-in owners left too, and their buildings 
                                                
39 University Neighborhood Housing Program data, procured by UNHP from Win2Data, April 2007 
40 Tabulation based on total Bronx units from 2005 US Census data, and pre-war units in relevant buildings 
from UNHP data. 
41 Jonnes, 1986 
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suffered from their absence; tenant alienation increased, and the social distance between the owners 
of buildings and their remaining tenants – including the racism attendant in relations between the 
suburbanizing white population and the increasingly Black and brown urban poor – was magnified.42 
As tenants left and took their rent payments with them, landlords began to cut corners on 
maintenance, and the cost of unattended repairs began to mount. Owners debated financial strategy 
around their buildings: rent increases drove tenants out, since the tenants who were left were the 
poorest who couldn’t pay. Emptying buildings became targets for vandalism. But rent reductions 
intended to keep buildings full pushed landlords further into the red.43 Even as buildings fell apart, 
code enforcement became impossible since landlords could not recoup the cost of repairs through 
rent and incurred new tax burdens for “improvements”. Additionally New York’s code enforcement 
arm at the time, the Housing Development Administration, was an urban renewal agency focused 
on shrinking the footprint of poor neighborhoods rather than improving conditions in existing 
housing.44 
The neighborhoods soon hit rock-bottom for both landlords and tenants. In his history of 
Newark’s parallel decline, Sternlieb describes the devaluation of buildings as so steep that landlords 
couldn’t even milk them – because resale of the buildings, the means for recouping some of the 
structure’s value and for capitalizing on the depreciation tax credit conferred on new owners, simply 
wasn’t possible.45 In response, some “investors” saw a different kind of value in the buildings, and 
began buying them from fleeing landlords – then burning them. A 1980 Village Voice investigative 
report on the massive wave of arson sweeping the Bronx found it to be a thriving business:  
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 Sternlieb, G. The Tenement Landlord (1966) and Sternlieb G. and Burchell, R. Residential Abandonment: 
The Tenement Landlord Revisited (1973) 
44 Reynoso, J. “Putting Out Fires Before They Start: Community Organizing and Collaborative Governance 
in the Bronx, USA.” Law and Inequality, 2006. 
45 Ibid. 
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“In the winter of 1978, the South Bronx was already a moonscape with abandoned, 
charcoaled shards. The cops who worked in the 41st Precinct no longer called their station 
‘Fort Apache.’ They called it ‘The Little House on the Prairie,’ because there were so few 
surviving buildings or families in the area… We have spent 30 months trying to piece this 
story together, not merely to name these urban traitors but also to explore and explain why 
whole neighborhoods of this city have been put to the torch. The idea that tenants set most 
of the fires themselves in order to qualify for public housing—or that vandals or street gangs 
set them—is a myth. The fact is that landlords set the fires in order to collect insurance 
money.”46 
 
Not all landlords were callous or desperate enough to hire arsonists to divest themselves 
from the Bronx. But ultimately, many who couldn’t repair the buildings, pay the property taxes or 
sell simply walked away from them. 
By 1976, the city had begun to try to take action. The City Council created both the Dept. of 
Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) and the local law allowing HPD to take over 
abandoned and tax-delinquent properties.47 By 1982, HPD owned 33,816 in rem units, 40% of 
which were located in the Bronx.48 By 1988, it owned 100,000 units.49 The city was also 
overwhelmed by the extent of its holdings, their urgent need for repairs, and their predominantly 
low-income tenants. Under HPD ownership, in rem buildings did not fare much better (although 
they were much less likely than others to burn); and their suffering was extended as the City, lacking 
a plan for disposing of the buildings to community groups or owners who could revitalize them, 
simply held onto them. Michael Stegman wrote about conditions in 1982: 
                                                
46 Conason, J. and Newfield, J. “Arson for Hire: The Men Who Are Burning New York” Village Voice, June 2, 
1980 
47 Reynoso, 2006 
48 Stegman, M. Dynamics of Rental Housing in New York City. (1982) 
49 Hirsch, E. and Wood, P. “Squatting in New York City:  Justification and Strategy” cited in Reynoso, 2006. 
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“A household in city-owned housing is nearly four-and-a-half times as likely to live in 
dilapidated housing than is the average New York renter… Not surprisingly, a very high 
percentage of in rem units are in boarded-up buildings or on blocks with such structures.”50 
 
The impact on Bronx buildings was exacerbated by the long duration of city ownership. 
Most of the buildings that HPD owned in 1994, for instance, had been in HPD’s portfolio for nearly 
the entire duration of the in rem property-taking program. Although the city attempted physical 
rehabilitation of some buildings, its efforts were not scaled to the problem and had minimal impact. 
HPD did not begin to divest itself until 1998, when it auctioned off buildings to non-profits, and 
for-profit developers and developed a system for selling tax liens rather than taking over more 
buildings.51 By then, HPD’s properties and the buildings in the surrounding neighborhoods bore 
deep scars of neglect. 
 
Bruises: The ongoing legacy of the Bronx depression 
Over the course of the Bronx’s struggle, the aggregation of unrepaired problems created the 
conditions for widespread structural problems in the buildings. Roof leaks and plumbing breaks 
created a host of water-related problems including rotten supporting beams, collapsing walls, sagging 
floors, the rusting apart of metal-framed staircases, pervasive mold and the collapse of defenses 
against rats. Other decay, probably created in part by the spread of rats through the interiors of 
walls, included fraying and exposed electricals. The shifting of the buildings contributed to cracks in 
foundations and retaining walls; breaks in gas, water and sewage pipes; tilting floors and gaps in 
window frames and walls. The depression also brought fire, toxic dumping, vandalism, squatting 
(both destructive and constructive versions) and other direct abuse of the buildings.52 While not 
                                                
50 Stegman, 1982 
51 McGowan, K. “Lien Days Ahead.” CityLimits.org, December 1998 
52 Bearak, B. “Turf Wars.” Shelterforce Online, May/June 1994 
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every building suffered all of these assaults, the depression created a collective decline in the integrity 
of Bronx pre-war housing stock. 
The Bronx depression, in addition to fostering a history of disrepair, also fostered a history 
of tenancy by socially and economically disadvantaged people. The presence of these tenants has 
had many interwoven effects – simultaneously contributing to deterioration, slowing legally-allowed 
price increases for privately-rented apartments and raising profit potential by renting to subsidy-
holders and to a decay-tolerant renter population with few other options. 
The Bronx disrepair, like decay in other low-income neighborhoods, was prolonged and 
exacerbated by residents’ lack of political and economic leverage, which translated into lack of 
investment in the buildings, neighborhoods and people of the Bronx. 
 
Price wars, habitability wars 
 Ironically, the staying power of low-income tenants was historically also a major factor in 
prolonging disrepair. Since this staying power persists, it shapes the current story as well as the past. 
Low-income tenants’ unwillingness to reject substandard housing by moving out, and their alternate 
strategy of patching problems themselves, to make staying possible, has allowed landlords to defer 
repairs for reasons of economics or convenience; this has been a feature of inner-city decline in 
many other cities as well. Simply put, low-income tenants have a much higher threshold for 
deteriorated buildings than higher-income tenants; they are much less likely to leave apartments that 
fall into disrepair, and those who do leave later in the deterioration process. This staying power is 
increased by the fact that low rents charged during the Bronx depression have provided a lower 
starting point for regulated rent increases.53 Tenants’ staying power leaves` buildings vulnerable to 
                                                
53 Until 2003, NYS rent laws stated that if a landlord charged a tenant less than the legally-allowed rent (a 
“preferential rent”, usually offered because the market would not support charging more) the preferential rent 
became the legal rent for the duration of the tenant’s stay. 
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deliberate “milking” practices – without fear of driving away tenants, landlords can turn the building 
to high-profit uses that threaten the building (as in one case described here, the landlord contracted 
apartments to the city’s Department of Homeless Services for use, essentially, as an extension of the 
homeless shelter system. The impact on building, tenants and shelter-placed residents was 
overwhelmingly destructive.) 
Tenants’ staying power is also a factor in slowing the growth in value of Bronx apartments. 
Turnover is an important opportunity for landlords to raise rents,54 and landlord advocacy 
organizations are vocal about the negative impact of long-staying tenants on their takings. But the 
effect of low-income tenants is arguably not all bad for rent rolls. On the one hand, landlords might 
argue that the pervasive presence of low-income tenants stops them from making improvements 
that would be worth higher rents – higher even than the inflated rents low-income tenants pay for 
relatively low-quality apartments.55 On the other hand, the presence of low-income tenants has 
meant that the buildings primarily draw other low-income tenants to fill vacancies. Low-income 
tenants often pay more for apartments than higher-income tenants even when self-paying for an 
apartment, because bad credit, large family size or checkered tenant history limits their ability to 
reject overpriced apartments. Possibly more significantly, low-income tenants often carry subsidies 
that either support above-market prices, or mitigate the direct cost to the tenant enough to allow 
tenants to accept above-market rents. Since tenants often have trouble finding landlords who will 
                                                
54 Under NYS law, a vacated apartment can be re-rented at a 20% increase. Apartment renovation costs can 
also be claimed back through rent increases; this opportunity is closely associated with vacancies/turnover. 
55 Interview: Jim Carpenter, New York Community Bank 4/19/07; also, the website of the Small Property 
Owners’ Association of New York (www.spony.org) links to a Cato Institute report: Tucker, William “Cato 
Policy Analysis No. 274: How Rent Control Drives Affordable Housing Out,” May 21, 1997 
(www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-274.html on 5/12/07) 
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accept subsidy vouchers, the supply of apartments available to them is also limited; in many cases, 
contrary to the logic of subsidies and scarcity of funds, they are price-takers.56 
Additionally, through the fatigue of small building owners and the transfer of in rem buildings 
to developers, control of these buildings has been concentrated in the hands of owners whose profit 
structure, constructed around multiple holdings and long time horizons, enables the use of “strategic 
decay.” 
Coming off of the long depression, Bronx buildings are in a bad state – among its 
neighborhoods are four of the city’s worst five, in terms of housing quality. They are two or three 
times more likely than buildings elsewhere to have multiple code violations; as a measure, the 
average citywide is 57.8 serious housing violations per 1000 rental units; in the Bronx, its 116, and 
that number is disproportionately distributed to poorer neighborhoods. What’s more, the quality of 
Bronx housing is still declining faster than housing in the rest of the city.57 As described in Chapter 1, 
Bronx tenants are still dealing with the depression as well. Although many circumstances have 
changed, the legacy of depression is still a defining feature of the Bronx landscape. 
 
Defining Bronx change: revitalization, gentrification… another fall? 
In spite of the history burdening its buildings, the Bronx is in a new condition shaped by 
converging currents: the revitalization of the burned-out and abandoned South Bronx, the outward 
push of the Manhattan housing market, the breakdown of social barriers that prevented middle class 
white people from moving into poor minority areas, the declining ability of rent regulation to hold 
down apartment prices, and other price factors. 
                                                
56 The “price-taker” condition runs counter to Stegman’s description of Newark tenants – who are willing to 
pay for poor conditions but not willing to accept price increases – but his model is premised on the idea that 
tenants can find better housing at comparable prices by moving further out of the city. Because Bronx 
residents’ housing choice is circumscribed by reliance on vouchers and lack of other housing, they are forced 
to accept both bad conditions and sellers’ prices. 
57 Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006 
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For most observers, this convergence is a clear sign that gentrification is imminent. So when 
landlords and low-income tenants face off over Bronx buildings, gentrification is the force over 
which both sides are likely to believe they’re struggling. Tenants see that landlords are doing 
everything they can to shift poor people out of apartments – slowing down the delivery of services 
and repairs, billing tenants for everything from day-late rent checks to purely cosmetic renovations. 
Landlords long to be rid of low-income tenants whom they view as freeloaders: users who pay far 
less for apartments than they are actually worth, resist the rent increases allowed by law, and all the 
while bring down the value of the building through destructive behaviors. While tenants struggle to 
stay in their apartments in spite of rent increases and physical disrepair, landlords struggle to 
improve their rent rolls (and in many cases, their buildings), and free themselves of oppositional 
tenants. 
  But for the Bronx, gentrification is more future symbol than immediate reality. Real estate 
values have climbed enormously over the last decade, and some pockets of the Bronx have clearly 
changed hands, culturally and economically. In most of the Bronx, though, tenants, real estate 
investors, city officials and community groups have widely varying ideas about when gentrification 
might arrive, if at all. 
In the interim, the players have developed strategies for waiting out the process. Tenants, for 
example, are increasingly doubling up in apartments as rents go up – not leaving. Landlords are 
making strategic decisions about when and whether to make deep renovations; for some, it makes 
sense to hold off until rent rolls are higher. For some tenants, it should be noted, the strategies are 
not working. The number of families in New York’s shelter system has nearly doubled since 2006,58 
and again, it begins disproportionately in the Bronx. Some landlords’ strategies are failing too. The 
                                                
58 Charts: Homelessness in New York City. Coalition for the Homeless, February 2007) 
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buildings included in case studies for this research were all held by owners who hedged too far, and 
ultimately lost control of their properties. 
The long-run outcome is still undetermined. And although gentrification is often viewed as 
an unstoppable market force, the Bronx may hold some surprises. Tenants’ bids to stay, and their 
capacity for accepting increasing crowding and poor-quality buildings, suggests that the expectation 
of tenant turnover may be unfounded. And some of the features of the Bronx market even resemble 
the precursors to earlier abandonment. Landlords’ apparent plans to defer intensive renovations may 
be thwarted by un-ignorable structural deterioration, as described in the case studies included here. 
Inflated building prices and high sales volume mean that many current owners have paid a lot for 
their buildings, often taking on debt in anticipation of substantially higher rents, and that under 
current conditions they can’t afford deep repairs. The conditions aren’t quite the same as in the past, 
but neither do they quite seem to admit gentrification. So what will happen to the buildings, the 
tenants and the neighborhoods of the Bronx? 
Since each building is populated by a set of landlords and tenants with different goals, 
resources and levels of engagement; and since the physical history of each building is different, 
getting a sense of where the Bronx is going as a whole requires looking at a cross-section of 
buildings’ experiences over time. It also requires merging on-paper information collected by the 
regulatory system with the more detailed and nuanced narratives of tenants, community groups and 
– where possible – landlords. The three case studies presented here examine tenants’ strategies, 
landlords’ own strategies as well as their beliefs about tenants, the how the physical condition of 
buildings is affected by landlord strategies, and what level of knowledge and intervention is available 
to regulators. They also draw on investment strategies, and connect larger market patterns to the fate 
of the individual buildings. Later, the case studies provide context for understanding findings from a 
larger sample of similar Bronx buildings.
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CHAPTER 3 
THREE BUILDINGS 
 
The tenants of the buildings documented for this research were all organized – eventually – 
by the Northwest Bronx Community & Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC), and won significant 
improvements. But before engaging with NWBCCC they endured long periods of decay that 
ultimately brought them to crisis. The nature of the decay; the means by which different kinds of 
landlords leveraged decay to manipulate their tenants and their properties; tenant responses to decay; 
and the role of the regulatory system in monitoring the buildings and enforcing housing quality all 
illustrate patterns occurring across the Bronx now. 
The case studies center around interviews with individual tenants who spearheaded 
organizing efforts in their building. In only one of the case studies did the landlord agree to be 
interviewed. To fill in the picture, interviews are included with other landlords, landlord advocacy 
groups and community advocates who interacted with landlords during each case. 
Providing insight from other angles are separate interviews with housing policy 
organizations, a mortgage lender with oversight of at least 450 Bronx buildings (which are 
mortgaged through his bank)59 and a bank analyst/hedge fund manager who studies investment 
practices. Those interviews are drawn in later, in the analysis of the case studies. 
 This chapter introduces the buildings, the tenants and the organizing, so that later chapters 
may expand on their stories.  
                                                
59 Data culled from UNHP Win2Data/Building Indicators Project 
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Source Google.com 
3569 DeKalb Ave. 
 At the north end of the Bronx, where Norwood becomes Woodlawn, two- and three-family 
homes hold the bottom layer of the New York middle class: blue collar homeowners or their grown 
children. The houses begin toward the end of 
the subway line that runs through the Bronx 
into Manhattan, express to City Hall and 
Wall Street. The last stop is at the Norwood-
Woodlawn line, where apartment buildings 
give way almost completely to houses. It’s 
also the bottom of Van Cortlandt Park, the 
Bronx’s large forest-and-field green space, 
and of Woodlawn Cemetery; together they 
cover about twice the area of Central Park. 
But below the park and the cemetery, the neighborhood is composed of apartment buildings 
centered on Gun Hill Road and Jerome Avenue. These buildings don’t benefit from the lower 
density of the blocks of houses, or the smaller-city feel of being on the outskirts. They are old, high-
density housing stock in large buildings, with no commercial or community spaces, located at the 
farthest reaches of the subway system. Wedged into a corner at the end of the neighborhood are two 
solid blocks of pre-war rent-regulated housing. In the middle of them is 3569 DeKalb. 
 
The bui lding & the t enants  
3569 DeKalb is a five-storey walk-up, divided into two sections in the tenement style. In 
total, there are 59 apartments. Constructed in 1926, the building appears – now that it has been 
intensively renovated – to have the features of the solid New York building stock of that era. In 
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other neighborhoods, buildings like this are architecturally appealing and may be candidates for 
gentrification in the near term. But this building continued to decay and amassed hundreds of 
violations, including lead paint; rotting beams; and exposed and illegal electrical wiring.60 (An 
otherwise mild-mannered housing organizer described the building as “a complete shithole.”61) 
The tenant who organized the building, Gus, is a professional and self-paying (unsubsidized) 
tenant. But he describes himself as the exception. In his estimation, in the years before 2003 just 
10% of the tenants worked and were self-paying. The other tenants were “mostly on welfare and 
Section 8… And there were a lot of apartments who were involved in drugs.”62 Others were 
supported by SSD and the NYC HIV/AIDS Service Administration. 
Many tenants were using their apartments as income-stretching resources by doubling up or 
building up arrears as far as possible before eviction. Asked if rents were high, Gus answered: 
“I can’t say it was expensive or cheap, because to anyone living in that building, I don’t 
know how they could afford it. Their income was a little higher than minimum wage, so their 
take-home salary probably amounted to the rent. A studio apartment was $650. I don’t know 
how they exist. They just doubled up – they have the cousin living in the house, and the 
brother… a one-person family can’t do it… And there’s no [cheaper] place to go.”63 
 
The building had, and has, serious problems with drug trafficking, safety and cleanliness, 
including tenant damage to the building. Throughout Gus’ tenancy, the super/manager cited these 
problems as reasons for wide-ranging non-repair of decay. 
“We asked for repairs, and they had excuses. They were saying the tenants don’t keep the 
building in good condition. They said drug dealers and tenants sit and eat on the stairs, 
throw garbage, do graffiti. But we were concerned about electrical repairs, too. Exposed 
                                                
60 HPD violations as compiled on PropertyShark.com. 
61 E-mail 3/6/07 from Chloe Tribich 
62 Interview: Gus Birru 3/15/07 
63 Ibid. 
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wiring all over the place. We had sparks in the apartments. At one point a flag on the roof 
caught fire from some wires. Luckily we were able to put that out.”64 
 
Individually, some tenants pursued their own repairs. Without knowledge of official 
channels for getting repairs and requesting code enforcement, the tenants did not consider 
contacting the city’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development, the agency responsible 
for housing quality. Instead, they went to court. At first the landlord’s representative agreed to make 
the repair. He then “did a patching fix and he took his rent. Three days later there was a hole in the 
same spot.”65 
 
The cri s i s 
In August, 2002, after several years’ complaints about faulty and illegally-configured 
electricals, water and gas leaks and widespread disrepair, exposed wiring ignited a gas leak inside a 
first-floor apartment.66 The fire killed an 8-year-old boy, and badly wounded his brother and father. 
In the aftermath, NWBCCC approached the tenants. Gus agreed to work on organizing the 
building. 
“After that kid died, that was something that just told me, okay, we’ve got to do something 
about this. There were a lot of kids in that building. That day, only one apartment burned, 
but a lot could happen. We had to fix the whole electrical system and the building… I’m not 
a 'patching problems’ type of person. When you talk to me about housing – housing is not a 
problem, it’s the system. But in that situation, it was just to save lives.”67 
 
                                                
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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Gus and the NWBCCC organizer, Chloe Tribich, knocked on doors, handed out flyers, 
explained tenant rights and asked tenants to put their problems in writing for discussion at building-
wide meetings. Although he had lived on the block for fifteen years, and in 3569 DeKalb for three 
years, he and the other tenants did not know each other; trust was absent. In particular, apartments 
where tenants were “involved in drugs” were “not favorable to organizing.” But as tenants began to 
make connections and learn about conditions in each other’s apartments, a few were galvanized by 
the realization that the building was in worse condition than they’d understood individually. While 
initially only the few self-paying tenants came to meetings, after a year they had drawn 30-40 tenants, 
and secured names and signatures. These included some who were deep in arrears, but had come to 
see the organizing as a chance to wipe the slate clean. Some were additionally motivated by 
NWBCCC research showing the extent of HPD and ECB violations – including one for exposed 
wiring, issued the day before the fire – and by the news that their real landlord was an investor who 
lived in an actual mansion. 
But many tenants did not view the landlord, or even repairs, as their main concern. They 
may have viewed a general clean-up of the building as a step toward changing the tone of building 
social life: 
“Mostly [the other tenants] were interested in safety… getting rid of the drugs and the 
people hanging out. And to be honest, we didn’t do much about safety. We implemented the 
Clean Halls [police surveillance] program; or at least we tried, but we didn’t get any response 
[from police.]”68 
 
The organizing campaign, supported by tenants of the landlord’s other buildings, faced a 
legal morass created by the landlord/investor’s filing to stop the transfer, and the managers’ filing to 
                                                
68 Ibid. 
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be recognized as owners in place of the investor. But three years after the fire, the tenants won. A 
local non-profit housing developer was named as the administrator and began renovations. The 7A 
administrator has since been transferred to yet another non-profit organization, but renovations are 
ongoing and have received excellent reviews from tenants, aside from criticisms for their slow pace. 
 
 
443 Cyrus Place 
 443 Cyrus Place is a 5-story walk-up 
building of 16 apartments, occupied primarily 
by Dominican immigrants, as well as New 
York native Puerto Ricans and African-
Americans. Although the building is 
technically in the Belmont neighborhood,69 
Cyrus Place is a short block within a little 
triangle of furniture shops, garages and two-family houses that is palpably cut off from Belmont by 
the strange angling of Third Avenue. Just above Cyrus Place, Third Avenue meets a railroad right-of 
way at a sharp corner, dividing the little enclave from a commercial district and the intensively-
fenced Fordham University to the north. The railroad’s path, cut below street level along Park 
Avenue, means Cyrus Place is linked only by sporadic foot-bridges to the west-adjacent 
neighborhood of Fordham. To the east, a steep hill leads to the rest of Belmont, an old-time Italian 
neighborhood that has retained its cannoli shops, delicatessens and church-centered street culture as 
it incorporated more domestic and immigrant Latinos, and Albanian immigrants.70 To the south, the 
                                                
69 “A City of Neighborhoods: DCP Citywide Neighborhood Map.” NYC Dept. of City Planning, undated. 
70 Bromley, R. “Globalization and the Inner Periphery: A Mid-Bronx View.” Annals of the American Academy of 
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443 Cyrus Place 
Source: City of New York, on 
PropertyShark.com 
blocks between Third Avenue and the railroad are a mix of residential buildings and disused or 
industrial lots, ending after about a mile at Bathgate Industrial Park. But in the triangle itself, 
furniture and garage operations spill out from storefronts to the sidewalk; several schools fill the 
streets with kids and parents; and the neighborhood bustles. 
 
The bu i lding & the t enants  
 In 2005, at least seven apartments were occupied 
by people with incomes low enough to receive subsidies 
(two with SCRIE71 and five with Section 8.) There were at 
least 17 children living in the building. Ada,72 who later 
became the building organizer, had lived in the building for 
20 years, along with family members in three other 
apartments. The other tenants knew each other to varying degrees. Most spoke both Spanish and 
English, and those tenants translated between the others. 
The building was showing signs of serious decay and disrepair. A pattern of vandalism had 
also emerged in the building, in which tenants implicate the super and manager. But the tenants of 
443 were accustomed to making their own repairs, and had more or less stopped bothering to call 
the landlord for problems they could manage themselves.  
In spite of the self-sufficiency developed by some tenants, in 2004-2005 the building was 
visited about twice each month by HPD inspectors, who found copious evidence of non-
maintenance and poor conditions. The problems listed seem all to be the result of simple decay, 
                                                
71 SCRIE: Senior Citizens’ Rent Increase Exemption, a state program that freezes low-income seniors’ rents; 
the state pays the landlord directly to make up the difference between the frozen rent and the legal rent. (New 
York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal. Rent Stabilization Code  , 1985 
http://www.dhcr.state.ny.us/ora/pubs/html/rentcode.htm) 
72 Pseudonym. 
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Source: Nate DeMarse, FDNY Squad 61, Bronx  
(http://www.fdny-squad61.com/) 
rather than tenant destructiveness – and they stayed mostly unfixed over the course of the 
inspections.73 
 
The Cri s i s  
 In September 2005, a top-floor apartment burned. 
The Red Cross placed the tenants in a long-stay hotel in the 
Bronx, although some camped in their apartments during the 
day to thwart vandals. Most tenants with Section 8 left. The 
New York State Department of Housing & Community 
Renewal (DHCR) lowered each tenant’s rent to $1. 
 When it seemed that the landlord was not actually making the repairs that would allow them 
to go home, the tenants started to look for help. They went to housing court, where like most 
tenants the represented themselves,74 but the landlord’s lawyer simply postponed the case at each 
court date by claiming “that HPD was remodeling the building, although they knew that was a lie.”75 
Instead of enforcing action, the court “gave them permission to remodel, without measuring the 
consequences [to tenants.]”76 
At the same time, they “did a lot of door-knocking” with elected officials and city agencies. 
Not knowing specifically what actions to request, they asked for general help with their problems. 
But the elected officials and agencies were also unresponsive. “ They said ‘oh, against landlords 
everyone is powerless.’”77 
                                                
73 HPD violation reports on PropertyShark.com 
74 The New York City Housing Court in the 21st Century: Can it Better Address the Problems Before It? New York 
County Lawyers’ Association, 2005. 
75 Interview: Ada 3/23/07 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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Eight months after the fire, the tenants joined the Northwest Bronx Community-Clergy 
Coalition (NWBCCC.) “And thank God, because if we hadn’t found the Coalition, we would’ve had 
to abandon the building,” says Ada.78 Armed with an attorney from the Urban Justice Center, the 
tenants intervened in the permitting process. They also began to learn about regulations governing 
buildings, landlords and tenancy, and became skilled in assessing legal issues around their own 
building. 
But the added pressure in court was insufficient to the task. While the courts repeatedly 
ordered repairs, verification was left to infrequent HPD inspections – or, in court, the landlord’s 
explanations against tenants’ reports of ongoing distress. More significantly, according to tenants, 
the courts never issued a single fine for unresolved HPD violations. The court had no teeth. 
Similarly, tenants’ efforts to bring in inspectors from the Department of Buildings had little effect; 
although DOB issued numerous violations, they seem to be unresolved (new violations confirm the 
old ones, according to DOB inspection records) and no fines are attached.79 The only inspections to 
produce fines appear to be those of the Environmental Control Board, which may have come as 
construction site visits rather than responses to tenant calls. Although the building has racked up 
$21,000 in ECB fines since the fire – most through failures to appear at hearings on reported 
violations – none has been paid.80 
Exasperated, the tenants turned to another tactic. Through NWBCCC, they joined with 
other distressed buildings in the Bronx to demand action from lenders. After a period of tenant 
protest and organizing, Citibank representatives toured the building and agreed to conduct better 
 
 
                                                
78 Ibid. 
79 NYC DOB Building Information System 
80 Ibid. 
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oversight of the uses of loan funds. Tenants’ apartments were remodeled, and the building is now 
more fully occupied than before the fire. 
But the repairs have opened a new landscape of conflict between tenants and the landlord. 
Many tenants are still engaged in claims that the work has been shoddy, dangerous or illegal – and 
more specifically, that shoddy work is another tool to drive them out of their apartments. 
“The future plans that exist [about the Bronx and gentrification] mean this building is going 
to be a co-op or a condo. And yes, the landlord is waiting for that day. But he wants the 
building to be empty at that time… We told him, if this building is a headache, sell it and 
we’ll buy it! But he doesn’t want to, or, he doesn’t say anything.”81 
 
While tenants believe that the 2005 fire was accidental, they say the fire department 
confirmed that a second fire in June 2006 was deliberately set. The tenants suspect the landlord – or 
another agent, since they believe the landlord has paid others to harass, threaten and commit illegal 
acts. Pressures on tenants have taken other forms: deferring repairs or “yessing tenants to death”, 
using repairs to drive up tenant costs, and threatening to use health and safety regulations to force 
another evacuation of the building.  
Tenants, for their part, engage in a counter-currency of pressure, bringing inspectors into the 
building for every violation, staying in touch with lenders – leveraging every avenue of institutional 
regulation. Even these do not always produce results: the record of DOB inspections since the fire 
shows more than half with findings of “No access to building, nothing observed.”82 Tenants’ main 
avenue of pressure, then, is simply staying bodily in the building. Their physical presence is the one 
                                                
81 Interview: Ada 3/23/07 
82 NYC DOB Building Information System 
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area of leverage in which they actually do better than both the landlord and the inspectors. They are 
there. 
 
1920 Walton Ave. 
 Walton Avenue runs the entire the length of the 
South Bronx, parallel to Grand Concourse and about 
two blocks over. The buildings in the wide corridor 
defined by the Concourse are big, heavily laid with 
marble and mosaic floors, solid and built to make use of 
natural light and air. In its heyday, Grand Concourse 
was “the Fifth Avenue of the Bronx,” where immigrant and first-generation families moved when 
they’d made a bit of money. By the 1960s those tenants had aged, and it became the street “where 
everyone’s grandmother lived,” according to my own mother, who grew up in New York’s suburbs. 
Walton Avenue embodies that history. 
Grand Concourse travels along the top of a steep ridge, so most of Walton Avenue is on a 
hill, which gives a person walking around Walton a distinct awareness of being near the Concourse 
or going away from it. On the “away” side is Jerome Avenue, defined mostly by elevated subway 
tracks and businesses that can tolerate the grime, like auto glass shops. The neighborhood of Mount 
Hope lies between these boundaries. To the south, Robert Moses’ Cross Bronx Expressway cuts 
through the neighborhood so viscerally that Walton Avenue actually ends and begins again on the 
other side. 
 
 
 
 42 
1920 Walton Avenue 
Source: City of NY, on 
PropertyShark.com 
The bui lding & the t enants  
 1920 Walton is a hulking 84-unit building with a courtyard entrance that is not grand 
anymore. From the late 1970s through the 1980s, it was owned by a landlord who kept the building 
“immaculate… an armed guard in the hallway, and trees.”83 (An armed guard 
was a good thing, according to tenants.) Tenants lived in the building for long 
periods of time, knew each other and socialized together. The building, like 
the neighborhood, was occupied mostly by Jewish families. The first Black 
tenants – including the two interviewed here – arrived at the end of the 1970s. 
As Willia and her neighbor tell it, the good landlord died. He passed 
the building to his business partner, who turned the management of the 
building over to a son. The son “didn’t do repairs, he just wanted the 
money. And that’s when we lost a lot of people,” says Willia’s neighbor. Apartments fell into major 
disrepair, which allowed rats – and in at least one case, fire – to spread between apartments. As 
frustrated tenants moved out, the landlord pulled in new tenants desperate enough to accept the 
conditions. This included large distressed families leaving the shelter system with rent subsidies, and 
the new wave of single women with children. 
The tenants of 1920 Walton are low-income Black, Latino and African families, with a few 
elderly Jewish tenants as holdovers from the earlier era. A significant (although unknown) 
proportion are funded by subsidies. Even Willia, who entered the building 28 years ago as a self-
paying tenant, is now subsidized. The increase in subsidy-holders reflects other changes in the lives 
of tenants: 
                                                
83 Interview: Willia McKeiver 3/23/07 
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“AIDS housing, Section 8, a lot of single mothers with Section 8… At first we had families 
with mother-father-children. But now we have a lot of single ladies with a lot of kids… the 
atmosphere has changed dramatically.”84 
 
Only two lines of apartments have multiple bedrooms, and another two lines are two-
bedroom apartments, totaling 24 apartments. The remaining 60 are one-bedrooms. But many, if not 
most apartments, seem to be occupied by subsidized families with multiple children. Many of them 
are doubled-up (or more) with unsubsidized poor families who self-pay as subtenants. 
The building went through some dramatic abuses and changes in ownership, and tenants 
organized in 2001, propelled by the memories of some who had known the building in its grander 
form. The organizing leveraged older residents’ “tenant family” bonds, and was able to draw in 
newer tenants by challenging the dire conditions in which they were living. 
“We asked people, aren’t you tired of this crap? Got rats as big as cats, don’t you want to get 
rid of them? That’s a good way to draw people… The Africans had so many rats, with 
9,10,11 kids sleeping on the floor. Another way was because of the plumbing. Most of them 
gotta be floating in water, or so many rats they’ve started killing them themselves. But no 
matter how much they might not want to fight, certain conditions will make people fight… 
They’ve finally come to the realization that moving don’t help. You’re still in the ghetto.”85 
 
The building didn’t organize until 2001, but Willia had acted on her own behalf much earlier. 
In 1997, she had convinced the state Department of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) to 
lower and freeze her rent on the grounds of extensive violations in her apartment. She also joined 
NWBCCC as an individual to address drug dealers’ colonization of her building. 
“I joined the NWBCCC on the Safe Streets committee, where you have meetings with the 
precinct; where you anonymously give the police locations and tell them what [dealers] are 
                                                
84 Interview: Willia McKeiver 3/23/07 
85 Ibid. 
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wearing, draw ‘em a picture if you have to. Other people didn’t necessarily want the police in 
here, but that’s how I felt and I wasn’t that much concerned with how other people did. 
Made it hard to organize, but I did it by myself.”86 
 
During most of Willia’s battles she worked on her own, learning her rights and the means 
available for pursuing them at the same time. But her confidence to do that came from an earlier 
organizing experience. She had lived in a Harlem building that was abandoned outright by the 
landlord. Tenants took it over, paid their rent into a maintenance fund and made repairs. Like the 
tenants of 1920 Walton, she had known next to nothing about the regulations governing housing 
quality – until, as has also happened in many buildings, “a girl from Mount Hope [housing 
advocates] came into the building and asked if we wanted help, and we learned a lot.”87 
 
In all three buildings, the tenants are overwhelmingly poor, their relationship to authority 
and enforcement is delicate, and they organized only when crisis pushed them to the point where it 
was just unavoidable. (The landlords are a bit more diverse, and their motives more difficult to tease 
out. They’re explored in Chapter 5.) In spite of major habitability problems, the tenants simply had 
no meaningful access to official channels of redress. Until they organized – and as their buildings 
deteriorated – it seems that no one was watching.
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CHAPTER 4 
WHO’S LOOKING OUT FOR THE BRONX? 
 
On paper, the city’s buildings are jointly regulated by the Department of Housing 
Preservation & Development (HPD) and the Department of Buildings (DOB.) The two agencies 
share responsibility for preserving the safety and quality of existing housing stock; HPD by 
addressing “housing standards” including health and safety issues for tenants;88 DOB by addressing 
issues with building structure and systems including sprinklers, boilers and elevators.89 State 
regulations additionally outline rules to be enforced, in plenty of detail: what landlords can charge 
for apartments, what the tenant can do to the apartment, how the apartments must be maintained, 
how the value of amenities should be measured, how repair requests should be handled, how loud 
neighbors can be, how hot apartments must be, etc.90 
But in practice, regulations only govern buildings when someone notices and reports a 
breach. Since apartments are private spaces and the guts of a building are not generally on view, 
noticing is left to tenants – or at best, to advocates who seek out problem buildings in order to 
foster and support tenant reporting. The three case studies presented here illustrate (among other 
things) how tenants struggle to gather and present data to a regulatory system that is not designed to 
receive it; and how the monitoring system misses, or even obscures, critical information. 
DOB violations are identified by inspectors’ visits to buildings, but those visits are not 
systematic. Instead, they are overwhelmingly conducted in response to tenant calls. In online reports 
about the case study buildings, callers state that buildings are shaking, illegal construction is 
underway, elevators are dangerously non-functional, bricks are falling, walls are cracking; in other 
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90 New York State. Multiple Dwelling Law, 1929 
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words, that buildings are deteriorating to the point of crisis. Inspectors’ responses show that tenants 
may call several times before the dispatched inspector can even gain access to a locked building; that 
while one inspection may result in a finding of “no action necessary based on observation,” a 
subsequent inspection will confirm the complaint. This occurs repeatedly in records for the “1% 
sample” of Bronx buildings described in Chapter 6. In the many cases where DOB inspectors do 
issue violations, they are dismissed without further inspections when landlords self-certify repairs or 
pay fines at hearings.  
HPD also conducts the vast part of its inspections in response to tenant calls. An inspector 
is dispatched to the building, often during regular working hours. If the inspector finds the tenant at 
home, they ask for access to the apartment and document any violations they see. The tenant may 
point out specific problems or not; the tenant may open the apartment completely for inspection, or 
deny the inspector access to some rooms. The inspector might knock on other doors in the building, 
and inspect other apartments, or not. If violations are apparent in the common areas of the building 
– if a rat runs across a hallway, leading the inspector to look for more signs of infestation – those 
may be added to the list. If not, no other violations are reported. The violation logs, which become 
the official public record on the condition of a building, reflect this piecemeal access. In 1920 
Walton, for example, a sagging floor in one apartment is reported on one inspection visit in January 
2006, while a concealed leak in the upstairs apartment is noted in February.91 Whose job is it to make 
the connection between the two reports, or to assess how deeply to target the repairs? What might 
happen to this building? Who knows about it? The regulatory process leaves gaping questions for 
Bronx buildings, and for the stock as a whole. 
 
 
                                                
91 HPD violations records. 
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Not the tenants: poor, alienated and off the radar 
The process of monitoring issues in buildings suffers enormously from its reliance on 
tenants. First, the personal engagement required for a tenant to carry out enforcement complicates 
building issues with the tenant’s own social and economic issues. In American Apartheid, Massey 
and Denton trace the connection between physical, social and economic segregation to intensive 
alienation from the paths of information and resource-provision available to other populations.92 
Tenants also have interpersonal relationships with their landlords that are burdened by race, 
class, gender, immigration and other power imbalances. Landlord attacks on low-income tenants’ 
social position are not uncommon. While very little information is gathered officially on these 
attacks,93 a 2003 survey by Mothers On the Move polled tenants of 18 low-income buildings on their 
interactions with management staff. 95 tenants, or 56% of respondents, said they’d received 
“disrespectful treatment” from management. 13 people reported that management had hung up the 
phone on them, 27 people had been misled or given conflicting information, and 11 had been 
directly harassed. Another 24 respondents declined to answer that survey question, possibly fearing 
that answering would create problems for them.94 This data mirrors broader reporting on the tone of 
landlord-tenant interactions, both historically and in the present.95 
Social attacks take on additional power when they are combined with efforts to force tenants 
out. At 443 Cyrus place, for example, Ada’s communication with the building manager over a billing 
dispute quickly translated into a forum for epithets and social accusation. In 2004, the landlord’s 
agent sued Ada, claiming she owed $54,000 in arrears, or nine years’ worth of rent. She was not yet 
                                                
92 Massey, D. & Denton, N. American Apartheid. (1993) 
93 Housing courts receive complaints about harassment but do not produce reports, nor analyze complaints 
for socioeconomic content. Advocacy groups like New York’s Citywide Task Force on Housing Court 
occasionally issue papers on observed court trends, but have not yet documented this component of 
landlord-tenant interactions. 
94 Key Findings Report, Mothers on the Move Tenant Survey. The Community Development Project of the Urban 
Justice Center, 2003. Results of community-based documentation of housing conditions in the South Bronx. 
95 Nielsen, Rachel “Housing Court Judged Inadequate.” CityLimits.org, January 29, 2007 
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involved in tenant organizing and did not have much information about her rights. But she 
challenged the claim out of necessity. 
“I sent him a letter with all the receipts from the rent I’d paid him in that time period. I 
wrote it in Spanish. He speaks Spanish. He wrote back… that he’d been here since 1974 and 
he speaks perfect English [and I’m less than him because I don’t], and called me mequetrefe.96 
Which is a very, very bad word. That was his answer.”97 
 
The tenants’ sense that management viewed them as unworthy or disposable was heightened 
by the extreme disrepair of the building. And it was further complicated by the fact that the 
manager’s own identities: white, so he claimed some superiority over the Black and Latino tenants; 
but an Albanian immigrant and also subject to discrimination in the city’s racial hierarchy. Within 
weeks the bill was settled for $144, suggesting the triviality of the claim. In hindsight, Ada realized 
not just that the claim was intended to harass her, but that the slur was a deliberate conjuration of 
social position to leverage power in the landlord-tenant business transaction. “It was because he was 
starting to [try to] get us out.”98 
 
Not the landlords: wielding social power in the housing market 
Even when landlords do not set out to disempower tenants, prevailing prejudices shape 
landlords’ relationships to tenants; and through them, tenants’ ability to challenge landlords by 
requesting enforcement. Low-income tenants in New York City are overwhelmingly Black, Latino 
and/or immigrants from poor countries, while landlords are overwhelmingly white and native-born 
or immigrants from wealthy countries. In the Bronx in particular, the stereotype of the Jewish 
                                                
96 Mequetrefe (n.): nosy, arrogant and insignificant person; “trifling” 
97 Interview: Ada 3/23/07 
98 Ibid. 
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landlord is pervasive (and in fact, Jewish landlords are not uncommon.)99 This brings with it the 
psychological baggage of historical landlord-tenant conflict, in which the tenant is clearly cast as the 
underclass, deprived of credibility as well as humanity and value. While the Jewish landlord 
stereotype misses the vast range of owners currently operating in the Bronx, the reality of the social 
divisions between the Bronx’s white landlords and their brown or Black tenants holds true.  
The divisions clearly disadvantage tenants to the extent of challenging their motivations, 
judgments and credibility. A landlord advocate and former manager illustrates this in her 
recollections of managing Harlem buildings (meaning low-income Black tenants.) For her, it seems, 
the tenants and the disrepair were the same. 
“[The buildings] were very difficult. Management becomes more and more difficult when 
tenants don’t have social responsibility. There were broken front doors and graffiti in the 
vestibule all the time.”100 
 
Asked if the damage came from tenants of the buildings or outsiders, she acknowledged that the 
tenants were generally not at fault. Even so, she could not separate the tenants’ expected behaviors 
from the building’s problems. “90% of the time it was outside people. But often it was the teenaged 
kids of the tenants, or parents who come home drunk.”101 Although the syntax is subtle, “coming 
home drunk” is not described a past occurrence in her explanation, but as a characteristic. 
Landlords’ social and economic animosity translates into a rejection of tenants’ right to 
assess deficiencies in their housing. As the Harlem landlord put it, housing advocates “should spend 
more time worrying about the behavior of the people in the neighborhood, and less getting after 
                                                
99 This does not seem to be definitively documented in current literature. But community organizing reports, 
title document data-mining and extensive sampling of building ownership point to many Jewish owners and 
building managers in the Bronx. 
100 Interview: Landlord and small owner advocate (anonymous) 4/13/07 
101 Ibid. 
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owners and helping tenants with the ‘free rent’ trick.”102 She also seems to find her beliefs affirmed 
by the fact that tenants aren’t seeking their own private property; as if renting is itself somewhat 
parasitic: 
“The government has a lot of programs for people in low-income housing to help them be 
first-time homeowners. But [in the past, HPD tried to deal with derelict buildings] by 
offering tenants the opportunity to buy their apartment and make the building better… And 
HPD was extraordinarily disappointed, because most tenants were not interested in buying. 
As long as they didn’t have to pay rent, they didn’t mind living in a hovel. Which brings me 
back to lack of pride and personal and welfare dependence.”103 
 
This logic appears in the literature of social exclusion theory: poor people’s social alienation 
is derived from lack of participation in the economic mainstream.104 In the case of Bronx tenants, 
alienation derives not only from lack of economic participation through undereducation, 
underemployment and lack of reward proportional to work; an additional layer of exclusion is 
derived from wealthier people’s perception that poor renters have squandered housing and other 
opportunities. Weighty arguments can be made for low-income tenants’ refusal to buy their 
distressed apartments (egregious building conditions for which tenant-owners would become 
responsible, poor management support from HPD, poor success rate) and for low-income home 
ownership programs (work and income requirements beyond the reach of most low-income renters, 
economic stresses that consume time and funds that would be needed to maintain a home), but they 
go uncounted. 
On the flip side, in the two case-study buildings where tenants had met their landlords face-
to-face, all interviewees’ first descriptor of any Jewish landlords was “Jewish.” The term itself was 
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completely devoid of disrespect; in fact, the interviewees went out of their way to say so. To them, it 
only connoted “white”, “privileged” and “separate”; and described the extent to which control over 
the building was separate from them. 
The fraught relationship between low-income tenants and their landlords does not seem to 
allow for either to explore the subtleties of the other’s economic and social identities. (If they did, 
tenants would still be seriously disadvantaged.) Instead, tenants’ and landlords’ crude socioeconomic, 
race-linked perceptions of each other create the environment in which they are supposed to operate 
as co-regulators of building quality. 
 
The trouble with authority: accessing it, avoiding it 
Real and perceived inequalities created two major barriers to tenant reporting on building 
conditions in the case study buildings. First, none of the tenants knew about the reporting system, 
much less about the rights and protections that would allow them to use it, until their buildings 
reached crisis-level decay. (Willia of 1920 Walton did enter her current building with a working 
knowledge of the regulatory system, but only because she had already lived in a building that had 
reached crisis.) Tenants learned about the regulatory system only because their buildings were in so 
much trouble that community organizers sought them out. While no citywide data is available on the 
proportion of New York City tenants who have never heard of HPD, a survey specifically of 
immigrant tenants found that 62% did not know any code enforcement agency existed.105  
Gus’ experience in 3569 DeKalb reflects both tenants’ lack of regulatory information and, in 
the absence of agency support, their desperate alternative strategies to try to create landlord 
accountability. Although most tenants were English-speakers and legal residents, they were unversed 
in the formal institutions of tenancy other than “landlords” and “tenants.” They knew their rent 
                                                
105 n=697; Hear This! The Need for Multilingual Housing Services in New York City. Communities for Housing 
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would go up at each lease renewal but were not aware of limits on how much rent could increase, or 
how increases were determined. Although they knew they could accrue a certain amount of arrears 
before the landlord sued them to demand payment, they did not know they could also initiate court 
actions to demand their own rights. In some cases tenants used non-payment to get to housing court; 
hoping an eviction proceeding would be an opportunity to have the court order repairs. But even 
that option, written into housing law as a protection for tenants, is not available to many low-income 
tenants – anyone whose rent is partially paid by New York’s welfare agency is legally prohibited from 
withholding rent for any reason.106 Although the city reports that its agencies are being accessed 
much more broadly by New Yorkers since the advent of its “311” hotline, information about code 
enforcement remains specialized knowledge.107 
Second, reasons for low-income tenants to avoid calling code enforcement are numerous, 
even for tenants who know how. Voucher-based Section 8 tenants are notoriously shy of code 
enforcement, because the Housing Authority’s payment on vouchers is contingent on the apartment 
being in decent condition. The tenants often fear that their rent checks will be stopped (with or 
without their knowledge); that they might be forced to move (while finding landlords willing to 
accept the vouchers is increasingly difficult); and that they might lose their subsidy altogether (either 
by failing to find an alternative apartment within the required time period, or just by revving up the 
machinery of a subsidy process that is difficult to navigate and expels people from the program on 
technicalities.) These fears are not unfounded; the danger to tenants is great enough that Section 8 
advocacy groups nationwide are now pursuing federal legislation to mitigate it. Meanwhile, 
                                                
106 Goodman, Emily Jane, “Withholding Rent While on Welfare” GothamGazette.com, May 2004 
107 “Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg celebrates the one year anniversary of the 311 citizen service hotline.” 
(Press Release.) NYC Mayor’s Office, 2004. 
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anecdotally, Section 8 tenants have on many occasions been pushed out of apartments when 
inspectors documented substandard conditions.108 
Adding to fears about institutional engagement, low-income tenants are often involved in 
underground and informal economies. Welfare subsidies are not enough to live on. On-the-books 
work often pays little, and for welfare recipients, reduces the amount of the entitlement.109 Even 
subsidies that require tenants to pay “only” 30% of their income in rent leave their beneficiaries with 
little money for anything else. Low-income people in general, as a matter of survival, leverage the 
resources available to them. Entrance into the informal economy is a natural and commonplace 
event. Informal economic activity is often considered a violation of subsidy, lease or law.110 
Within the informal economy, a housing subsidy is an incredibly valuable leverageable 
resource – particularly for people who are willing to withstand some discomfort themselves in order 
to raise needed cash – because apartments can be subdivided to bring in additional rent. In the two 
larger case study buildings, doubling-up was the norm. Willia describes her neighbors’ dilemma: 
“American Black people don’t like to double up. But…the Africans do four families, and the 
others two at least. A blue collar person cannot afford New York City rents.”111 
 
Gus reports the same: doubling-up alongside other income-augmenting strategies. In most 
cases the strategies have to be secret; otherwise income is deducted from subsidies or recipients are 
deemed to be “too wealthy” to qualify. This is a problem across the board for subsidies that 
mitigate, but do not actually alleviate, poor people’s income crises.112 
                                                
108 Emily Patterson, Seattle Tenants’ Union Section 8 Organizing Project, phone interview 4/27/07 
109 Cauthen, N. When Work Doesn’t Pay: What Every Policymaker Should Know. National Center for Children in 
Poverty, June 2005 
110 Venkatesh, S. “Getting Ahead: Social Mobility Among the Urban Poor.” Sociological Perspectives, Summer 
1994 
111 Interview: Willia McKeiver 3/23/07 
112 Cauthen, 2005 
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But doubling up is illegal according to subsidy contracts, housing code and individual leases. 
So is truancy, even if kids are skipping school to help their parents make rent. And so is drug 
dealing, from which more than one tenant in 3569 DeKalb derived their income. Here again, tenants 
have obvious reason to fear the presence of authorities. In a building where the informal economic 
activity included violent, quasi-organized crime, involved tenants actually stopped Gus and other 
tenants from accessing it. As the instigator of tenant-driven code enforcement in his building, Gus 
himself came under violent attack from his neighbors. Ultimately, he moved out of the building in 
fear of his life. 
Section 8 tenants at 443 Cyrus Place never engaged with building-wide organizing, so their 
feelings about engaging in code enforcement are unclear. But HPD violations history shows that 
their building was visited by inspectors – who usually saw the same apartment on each visit – 
multiple times in the years before 2005.113 The occasional reports of violations in other apartments 
likely mean that the inspector sometimes found other tenants at home who agreed to show their 
apartments. But at least seven apartments occupied by subsidy-holders were never inspected. It 
seems very probable that some of those tenants actively refused inspectors entry. While speculation 
about the reasons may not be useful, the avenues for speculation are telling: the tenants were 
subsidized, they were poor, they were rumored to have side deals with the super. As with so many 
Bronx tenants, a slew of possible factors existed that might have kept them from cooperating with 
authorities to enforce housing quality. 
This picture extends outward through the Bronx. Throughout the borough, 22% of 
apartments are rented to subsidized tenants. In several swaths of the South Bronx, more than 46% 
of units are rented with subsidies. (To understand the magnitude of that effect, consider that the 
case study buildings are in neighborhoods with much lower proportions: Ada’s and Willia’s are 34% 
                                                
113 HPD violations history as posted on PropertyShark.com. 
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subsidized, Gus’ is just 19% subsidized.) 114 There are no specific statistics for how many families live 
doubled up in the Bronx, but the mass homelessness that begins in the Bronx (like homelessness 
citywide) is frequently preceded by doubling up. The necessity for nearly-homeless families to find 
doubled apartments, combined with the strong informal economy created by low subsidies, 
underemployment and the Bronx’s 12.7% unemployment rate115 essentially guarantees widespread, 
necessity-driven but illegal uses of apartments. Bronx tenants are simply not a population that can 
freely expose private identities through the public process of code enforcement, nor generally run 
the risk of “counter-enforcement.” 
 
No teeth & no eyes: the paper tiger of building regulation 
Even after inspections document illegal conditions, tenants aren’t relieved of their policing 
duties. Enforcement of repairs falls again to the tenant, who is supposed to pursue them in housing 
court if the landlord doesn’t comply. But the courts are of little help: landlords’ easy capacity to 
defer court dates, non-enforcement of fines, the near impossibility of criminal charges, and general 
lack of consequences for non-compliance mean landlords have little regulatory incentive to make 
even cosmetic repairs.116 The single real threat to landlords is the HPD Emergency Repair Program, 
which in a few extreme cases enacts direct enforcement. Under this program, HPD hires contractors 
to perform repairs (generally doing poor patchwork at inefficient prices, by according to both 
landlord and tenant advocate interviews) and bills the owner.117 Otherwise, tenants’ recourse (unless 
they find means of exerting pressure outside the regulatory system) is in persistently dragging the 
                                                
114 Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006. 
115 Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006. 
116 Inequitable Enforcement: The Crisis of Housing Code Enforcement in New York City. Association for Neighborhood 
and Housing Development with The Public Advocate for the City of New York, 2003 
117 To understand how few these cases are, and what minimal threat they pose to landlords, consider that 
legislation before the City Council would provide for the ERP to increase its capacity for systemic repairs to 
200 buildings per year, citywide. This is detailed in Chapter 6. 
 56 
landlord and themselves to the city’s housing court. If pro se tenants can withstand pressure from the 
hired attorneys who frequently represent landlords in court, they can ask the court to inspect, order 
repairs and create a further public record of habitability problems. But the court’s enforcement 
consists mainly of re-sending HPD inspectors to check up on the progress of repairs. Often, the 
best courts can offer to tenants with time, confidence and endurance are rent reductions that may 
act as economic incentive to a reluctant landlord. Ultimately, enforcement that does take place is 
often achieved at great cost to tenants in time, money and opportunity. After the fire in 443 Cyrus 
Place, for example, the organizer and her neighbors spent months going between their Red Cross 
shelter and the courthouse, pleading for basic restoration of their homes. “We went to court, and 
the lawyer just kept postponing the date. That’s all that happened, ever.”118 Ultimately, they found 
their leverage with the landlord’s mortgage-holder instead. 
Beyond the inadequacy of tenant-driven enforcement, the regulatory limits itself even further 
by relying on tenants even for general information about building conditions. While landlords are 
legally required to file information about rents charged, and to have boilers, elevators, gas lines, 
construction etc. approved through a permitting process, these are one-time engagements that do 
not serve to track a building over time. The regulatory system’s knowledge of a building’s real-world 
operations is gathered mainly through tenant reports. 
It suffers even further from the lack of a system for monitoring data that are collected on 
each building. When violations are not dismissed and landlords fail even to appear, DOB’s database 
shows that fines levied – even those ranging into the tens of thousands of dollars – go uncollected. 
(A thorough examination of several buildings’ DOB records is included in Chapter 6.) 
Technically, it should be noted, tenants are not the only responsible party for code 
enforcement. Landlords, too, are responsible for maintaining buildings, noticing problems and 
                                                
118 Interview: Ada 3/23/07 
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maintaining appropriate contact with regulators. But landlords are often absent or obscured. More 
worrisome, as a group they are less and less concerned with the quality of their buildings in the near 
term. Their role in regulating building quality is no more assured than the role of tenants. 
Unable to rely on landlords, tenants, or even its own information-gathering, the housing 
regulatory system simply does not have a workable mechanism for knowing when a building is 
approaching structural crisis, nor for preventing crises, nor for mitigating the power imbalances that 
threaten buildings, nor for balancing the property rights of landlords against the public’s right to a 
decent pool of housing. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IN THE VACUUM: INVESTORS INVENT THE BRONX 
 
The City may not be doing well at running the Bronx as a housing pool, but someone else is 
trying their hand at it. Since 1996 more than 1,800 of the Bronx’s 4,650+ large, prewar rental 
buildings have been bought and sold in the Bronx at least once – meaning that at least two-fifths of 
our buildings have had their futures signed off (on) by a lender and an owner, both acting as 
investors. Looking back to 1990, more than half have been bought and sold at least once.119 Many 
more have been refinanced, which also puts them at least nominally under banks’ direction. 
Regulatory frameworks on paper, from HPD’s rules for operating buildings to mortgages’ 
“good repair” clauses, direct landlords to maintain their properties, deal with the human needs of 
tenants, and operate their buildings as bona fide housing. The history of real buildings, including the 
Bronx’s buildings, shows that some landlords enter into ownership with those intentions and others 
don’t; some set up the terms of their ownership, through financing and maintenance decisions, in 
ways that ultimately prevent them from doing it. 
The Bronx’s history illustrates how important it is to understand how investors, including 
owners, are viewing their properties. It is especially important now, as the Bronx is changing. The 
beginnings of housing-driven gentrification are clearly setting the backdrop for some landlord-tenant 
struggles, and some investors are clearly banking on it. But other investment patterns point more 
toward the old pattern of abandonment. Although investors’ motivations are often fairly secret and 
sometimes difficult to divine, a look at the larger market and then at the case studies within that 
market, describes a range of investment and ownership approaches. 
 
                                                
119 United Neighborhood Housing Program Building Indicator Project 
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The Bronx is hot 
The buying craze in the Bronx is the subject of big buzz. The New York Times and other city 
papers, catering to the persistent question of where an upper middle-class person might still be able 
to buy a home, have been touting newly-converted co-ops in previously untouted Bronx 
neighborhoods.120 The sale prices of whole buildings have increased by around 60% over the last 
decade.121 
It’s not hard to understand why Bronx apartments for sale are hot: they’re cheaper than 
apartments elsewhere, and buyers either feel fine about living in mostly-rental, mostly-poorer 
neighborhoods and/or expect the neighborhood to gentrify.122 But the rationale for Bronx building 
sales volume and prices is less obvious. Research conducted by the University Neighborhood 
Housing Program (UNHP) indicates that the 60% price escalation over the last decade has come 
without a parallel increase in actual income from buildings. In fact, the research (which adjusts both 
building sale prices and rental income for inflation) finds that rental income has been relatively 
constant. Anecdotally, community groups report an enormous increase in the multiple of rent rolls 
for which buildings are selling “in the range of nine to ten times rent roll” as opposed to the usual 
multiple of two to four.123 Among the market-watchers interviewed here who have not been recent 
buyers, these prices smack of manipulation; they don’t make economic sense. As UNHP’s Executive 
Director Jim Buckley put it, “I keep thinking there must be some John Grisham novel in this story.” 
A few factors, taken together or separately, might explain Bronx bullishness. Some investors, 
including some interviewed here, firmly believe in the “upside” potential of the Bronx market – the 
                                                
120 See, for example, Cohen, J. “The Hunt: Fitting Alaska Into the Bronx.” New York Times, April 22, 2007 
121 Buckley, J. and O’Leary, C. A Real Estate Bubble in the Bronx? A Study of Trends in Bronx Multifamily Housing 
Pricing, 1985 to 2001. United Neighborhood Housing Program, 2003 
122 A proliferation of articles on middle- to upper-income Bronx buyers references these motivations; they 
include Cohen, 2007 above; see also Hughes, C.J. “Living In: High Brigde, the Bronx, Home of the Bronx 
Roar” New York Times, May 20, 2007 and Appelbaum, A. “Built for Comfort, Not for Speed.” New York 
Magazine, May 9, 2005 
123 Rising Values In a Highly Subsidized Market, United Neighborhood Housing Program, March 2005 
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likelihood that rent rolls will increase enough, and within the buyer’s time frame, to justify the sale 
price.124 (In 2003, for example, the Bronx was not even included in real estate giant Massey Knakal’s 
tabulations of New York multifamily sales.125 It is now.) Given housing pressures in Manhattan and 
other boros, the Bronx’s relatively low rents and development initiatives targeted to specific Bronx 
neighborhoods, the expectation of rising prices is fairly intuitive. 
The proliferation of low-interest loans also appears to be driving prices: the cost of loans is 
relatively low, so for the moment borrowers can support their debt service and the operations of 
their buildings on the rents paid by current low-income tenants.126 This approach, too, is supported 
by the expectation of gentrification. The “typical multi-family loan” is a 10-year loan with a 5-year 
fixed interest rate, and an upwardly-adjustable rate for the next five years. Since interest rates are 
likely to rise from their low point, borrowers would have to believe that by the time their mortgage 
becomes adjustable-rate, they could increase building income to cover increased debt service.127 
Supporting this market view is the idea that “the city as a whole is doing well, housing 
pressures show no sign of abating and cash is abundant. So investors seem to look at Bronx 
buildings as a safe harbor for unusually long-term investments.”128 One new buyer explained to Jim 
Buckley just how long-term his goals are: 
“He had two reasons [for buying a Bronx multifamily building]: he had cash and 
needed to do something with it, and he wanted to give something to his 
grandkids. He didn’t expect the building to make money till his grandchildren 
were ready to use it – that’s some very patient capital. But most of the stuff we 
hear is that people have money that they made in the stock market, or they just 
think Bronx real estate has upside potential and is safer than the stock market.”129 
                                                
124 Interviews: Frank Anelante 4/16/07 and Manny Stein 4/9/07 
125 Oser, Alan S. “For Rental Buildings, A Rising Market” New York Times, October 5, 2003 
126 Housing Bubble and Interviews: Frank Anelante 4/16/07 and Jim Carpenter 4/19/07 
127 Interview: Jim Carpenter 4/19/07 
128 Interview: Frank Anelante 4/16/07 
129 Interview: Jim Buckley 4/9/07 
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Private capital has also generally become more available as increasing wealth lands in the 
pockets of stock market investors. This “free range cash” 130 fosters a new set of housing investors 
seeking to avoid capital gains taxes; park their capital in an investment with high returns; and, in that 
owners of capital are not necessarily owners of information, generally “jump on a bandwagon” of 
investment in commercial real estate.131 At least one pool of these buyers is suburban professionals, 
for whom making a “nest egg” real estate investment would not be a strange event.132 A cursory 
analysis of groups of 2-3 buildings sold as bundles within the last five years finds that many are 
registered to professional offices (apparently non-real estate-related) or residential addresses in Long 
Island and Westchester.133 
 
 But a separate category of investment does not seem to bank on gentrification. Instead, it 
banks on IRS tax code governing real estate transfer, capital gains tax and depreciation. U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code Section 1031134 creates conditions under which investors profit simply from holding 
and exchanging real estate, apart from drawing rental income. The code allows investors to avoid 
taxes on capital gains from the exchange of like-kind real estate,135 so they can accumulate wealth by 
“trading up” for increasingly valuable properties, depreciating them, and then reselling them at a 
gain (in an exchange for another property) without being taxed on the gain in value.136 Since the 
transactions are exchanges, each participant is both a buyer and a seller. As a seller, the participant 
                                                
130 Interview: Jim Buckley 4/9/07 
131 Interviews: Jim Buckley 4/9/07, Manny Stein 4/11/07 
132 “Invest your nest egg in a house?” Kiplinger's Personal Finance Magazine, undated; posted on the website of 
the IRA Association of America 5/23/07. 
133 Tabulations from UNHP’s dataset, cross-referenced with registration information from the NYS Entities 
and Corporations Database, Google.com keyword searches and Google.com mapping. 
134 IRS code: Title XXVI, §1031 in US Code Collection. Cornell Law School, undated. 
135 “Like-Kind Exchanges – Real Estate Tax Tips” US Internal Revenue Service, undated. 
136 A proliferation of tax/investment blogs are also devoted to this topic, including www.1031alternatives.net, 
www.1031x.com and myriad others. 
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realizes untaxed gain; and as a buyer they can acquire a property that’s much more valuable than 
they might otherwise have been able to afford, since the purchase is tax-free.137 
For relatively small investors like Manny Stein, Section 1031 of the IRS code “makes it 
beneficial not to sell real estate”138 but to exchange it instead, by reducing taxes on such exchanges 
and effectively penalizing those who “try to get out of real estate”139 altogether. For landlords 
seeking to profit off of relatively low-rent buildings instead of getting out of the Bronx market, this 
may encourage milking or deferring maintenance; for others it encourages trading their properties 
for real estate elsewhere, which likely means transferring them to outside investors who, historically, 
are less likely to maintain buildings than local owners.140 
 For larger investors who have the resources to manage large portfolios over time, through, 
Section 1031 offers  a vast opportunity for free money for holding and then transferring buildings. 
The more buildings investors can hold in their possession, the larger the tax credit and the greater 
the opportunity to collect by exchanging the buildings for others.141 An additional element of 
Section 1031 to support large-scale outsider investment is the Tenant-in-Common rule, by which 
investors are exempted from participating in management.142 
 The free money/no management scenario holds several meanings for Bronx buildings. First, 
higher prices are actually more profitable for these investors since they increase the value of the 
exchange, decrease recorded gains and yield higher annual depreciation. Second, the state of the 
actual buildings is fairly irrelevant, as long as they stand up long enough to be transferred, and as 
long as prices continue to be insensitive to buildings’ real-world conditions. Third, tenants’ 
                                                
137 Rosenfeld, Joel “Section 1031 - tax deferred exchanges: 'Real estate's best-kept secret for tax relief'” Real 
Estate Issues, Winter 2000/2001, and Interview: Felice Gelman 5/17/07 
138 Interview: Manny Stein 4/11/07 
139 Ibid. 
140 Sternlieb, 1966 and Sternlieb & Burchell, 1973, and Interview: Laura Jervis 4/6/07 
141 Interview: Felice Gelman 5/15/07 
142 Topley, B. “TIC 1031 exchanges high yield solution” Real Estate Weekly, Sept. 29, 2004 
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objections to conditions – even to the point of rent strikes – are largely meaningless because owning 
the buildings is profitable independent of rental income.143 
Although Section 1031 transfers are a fairly recent phenomenon – allowed since 1986, but 
invigorated later by subsequent amendments to code and investor buzz144 – they bear some 
resemblance to the tax code-driven depreciation tactics that once led inner cities to abandonment.145  
 
Fuel to the fire: troubled buildings and a sellers market 
 Not all “craze” investment is predicated on gentrification, but the current owners 
interviewed here note that the expectation of gentrification among less sophisticated small-scale 
investors, seems to be fueled by the inflated prices fueled by 1031 exchanges. The current owners, 
on the other hand, are not sold on the “upside.” UNHP interviewed sellers and found that: 
“some are selling because prices have gone so high that it would just be foolish 
not to sell. A lot of owners – including some non-profits – are saying ‘we’ll sell it 
now and anticipate we can buy it back down the line when prices drop.’”146 
 
Other owners are selling because they find that actual operating costs are simply not 
supported by rents. Frank Anelante, a seasoned real estate owner/manager who takes the long view 
on his properties, sees the current Bronx market as unreasonably inflated and is hesitant to engage 
with it. But he also sees the logic in selling. For owners of occupied units, rules for operating and 
                                                
143 Investors may not be interested in rental income, but Section 1031 requires them to have some role in 
management. This requirement seems to be fulfilled by contracting management to semi-independent 
managers, who collect rent and are responsible for maintaining the building. It’s unclear in many cases 
whether managers are generally expected to run the buildings off of their operating income, or whether 
operations are directly supported by investors as well. But the reluctance of managers to disclose whether 
they are, in fact, landlord/owners – noted by tenants in all three case study buildings – suggests that the 
owner/manager relationship is a feature of investment strategy. 
144 Rosenfeld, 2000; McLinden, S. “1031 Exchangers Test the Waters” National Real Estate Investor, June 
2004 and Interview: Felice Gelman 5/17/07 
145 Sternlieb & Burchell, 1973 
146 Interview: Jim Buckley 4/9/07 
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repairing apartments are “onerous,” and “long-term owners, people who inherited their buildings, 
third-generation owners are getting out of the market.”147 These owners’ troubles highlight the 
unsustainability of operating Bronx buildings bought at inflated prices – at least for owners who 
intend to operate them in good faith. The buildings are also going to be expensive to run, and don’t 
produce big incomes. Rather than speculators waiting for a future profit, or recent buyers whose 
operating costs may initially be floated by mortgages, they’re running buildings on their current 
income. And they’re finding it difficult. Cost problems especially threaten Bronx housing because 
their history means they’ll need more than just cosmetic repairs. According to Frank Anelante, the 
fiscal balancing act is further complicated by rules that push landlords to do repairs in bulk, instead 
of incrementally. 
“Buildings that haven’t been renovated are starting to deteriorate even more. 
[But] the city passed a lead paint law that made it really onerous to do moderate 
rehab… And part of moderate rehab is structural repairs: replacement of beams 
in bathrooms, etc. 
 
“It used to be that I could go into an occupied apartment, cover the work areas 
during the day, restore water at night and resume the next day. Now the law 
requires that before tenants come back in we have to have an independent 
testing agency test the air for lead. It takes 3 days just to get results back! So now 
if we want to do rehab, we have to relocate people… It’s arduous, expensive, 
disruptive to tenants. So production [of both cosmetic and structural rehab] has 
dropped. I was doing 200-300 moderate rehabs per year before, but I haven’t 
done any for the last 2 years.”148 
 
Instead, Anelante points out, owners are forced either to allow their buildings to deterioriate 
or just sell. And in fact, the sales volume on 5- and 6-storey prewar buildings has increased 
                                                
147 Interview: Frank Anelante 4/16/07 
148 Ibid. 
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enormously since the 1970s. Total sales volume over time is difficult to ascertain, since only the last 
sale of each building appears in UNHP’s data, and other market reports don’t detail sales volume 
specific to the Bronx. But the UNHP data gives shape to the real estate gossip. A huge jump in early 
2007 sales reflects a bundled purchase of 41 buildings throughout low-income Bronx neighborhoods 
by an anonymous foreign LLC. The company’s US jurisdiction is in Delaware, a location of choice 
for usurious investors.149 In the previous year, the numbers were boosted by large bundled sales on 
one end: including 10 buildings to a California-based group currently under pressure for profiteering 
through strategic disrepair there, at least 21 buildings to an investor listed only through a New York 
law firm, and 28 to a New Jersey-based investor in low-income housing. On the other end, they 
were boosted by huge numbers of small bundles sold to local investment groups, individual foreign 
investors, and small, suburban individual partnerships that look very much like family nest eggs: 6 
and 7 to two Long Island investors; 6 to an investment company on their “first major venture into 
the Bronx,150” and many other 1-3 building groupings.151 
The volume of sales is worth repeating, just for its enormity: 40% of the building stock that 
typically houses low-income Bronx renters has changed hands in since 1997. Half of those sales have 
occurred in just the last three years. And in keeping with Frank Anelante’s assessment that owners 
are selling because they can’t afford maintenance, the buildings sold are of increasingly bad quality. 
The graphs below show how buildings sold since 1990 are currently in the worst condition of all of 
                                                
149 The information on building owners listed here has been compiled through a search process. The UNHP 
BIP database lists the “on-paper” ownership of each building, almost always a Limited Liability Corporation. 
The NYS Department of State Division of Corporations maintains an online database for entity information, 
at http://appsext8.dos.state.ny.us/corp_public, which lists the address at which the entity receives mail, and 
occasionally the name of a person or company who is a registered agent for the LLC. Google text and map 
searches provide further clues about the true owner of a building, the scale of an owner’s investment, their 
management history, etc. 
150 Rejournal.com, “News, September 2006” 
151 Since buyers often use a different LLC name for each purchase, and LLCs themselves are not uniformly 
registered, uncovering how many buyers have purchased how many bundles is incredibly labor-intensive. 
Most of the bundles here were more easily identifiable as multiple sales on a single date. 
 66 
this pool of housing stock. The buildings sold most recently are consistently the worst buildings in 
the pool.  
 
Even as building sales volume increases, buildings in the wors t  condition 
are more likely to have been purchased recently than good buildings. 
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UNHP’s Building Indicator Project, factoring in exorbitant sale prices alongside physical indicators 
in its assessment of buildings’ risk of decay, concludes that many more recently-purchased buildings 
are at risk than those with current physical problems. While sales focus on buildings with problems, 
current approaches to ownership run on a fairly long, multi-dimensional continuum of intentions. 
The case studies illustrate some of these. 
 
3569 DeKalb: The Equity-Draining Boor  
3569 DeKalb was purchased in 1997 by an investment LLC. Although there were some 
maintenance problems at the time of sale, there had been almost no “C” (immediately hazardous) 
violations since the late 1970s. Within the first three years, though, the new owner had racked up 
more than forty C violations for peeling lead paint, concealed leaks, garbage, filth, and illegally 
locked egress. Violations reports continue to show general non-maintenance of the building, 
including pervasive leaks; loosening basins, faucets, radiators, doors and fire escapes; corroding 
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metal; exposed and broken electrical connections; deteriorating or missing floors and windows; 
vermin infestation. Finally, just over 5 and a half years from the purchase date, pervasive, expensive 
mold. By then, the building was sagging so severely that HPD ordered all doors refitted on one 
apartment, and had issued vacate orders on at least two apartments because of dangerous disrepair. 
(At an inspection one month later, the apartments were still occupied.)152 DOB records show a host 
of structural problems: slanting, hole-ridden and rotten floors, ceiling and walls, and a frightening 
jerry-rig of basement electrical wiring.153 
Violations went unresolved and thousands of dollars in fines went unpaid, signaling landlord 
disinterest in maintaining the building both physically and administratively. DOB records do not 
show a single request for work permits or certification of repairs – in fact, no action by the owner at 
all. 
In August 2002, the building reached its limit. Exposed wiring ignited a gas leak inside a 
first-floor apartment. The fire killed a small child, and his brother and father were badly injured. The 
building was ordered vacated, and shortly afterward the tenants won a battle they’d begun two years 
earlier: to have a court transfer control of the building to a third-party administrator. Incredibly, the 
owner tried to challenge the transfer and retake the building; he failed. 
In the process of campaigning for the transfer, tenants and community groups had been researching 
the elusive owner, Frank Palazzolo. They were aided in part by an HPD subpoena naming 97 
separate LLCs through which he had likely been conducting business.154 Through this research they 
                                                
152 Historical violations records as compiled on PropertyShark.com. 
153 DOB Buildings Information System, online at a810-bisweb.nyc.gov/bisweb/bsqpm01.jsp. 
154 NYC Dept. of Housing Preservation & Development, subpoena issued March 2, 2004. (Provided by 
Housing Here & Now, NYC.) 
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uncovered major financial wheeling and dealing involving the building: while Palazzolo had made no 
investment in the building at all, he had bundled it with 34 others to leverage a $35.8m loan.155  
While Palazzolo was extremely active in securing financing for his buildings and buying 
additional buildings,156 Gus points out that he was not especially picky about collecting rent. In fact, 
even after the fire, organizing the lowest-income tenants was difficult exactly because the owner was 
so thoroughly disengaged from the building that many were living essentially rent-free. 
“When you come to people who… cannot afford rent… if they find a landlord 
that will let them stay without paying rent for three or four months, they don’t 
care if the landlord fixes anything or not.”157 
 
This apparent contradiction supports the idea that Palazzolo was approaching the building 
purely as a pawn for his activities in the larger real estate market, rather than looking to the 
building’s real-world operations to generate income. Instead, in this building as reportedly in others, 
Palazzolo employed a management company to whom rent checks were written and whom tenants 
firmly believed was the building owner. It would seem that the tenants and physical building were 
barely real to Frank Palazzolo. 
The 3569 DeKalb story may fall at the extreme end of Bronx landlording tactics, but 
Palazzolo’s general financing approach is not strange. Draining equity from Bronx buildings – 
leveraging them to the hilt without investing in maintenance, in addition to stockpiling them for 
1031 exchanges – appears to be gaining popularity, especially as investment groups gather control of 
large numbers of buildings that can be bundled to greater effect. The practice is supported by the 
inflated “bubble” valuation of buildings, which are collateralizing enormous loans. It seems logical 
                                                
155 Moss, Jordan and Wichert, William “The Palazzolo Buildings: Tenants Pressure Bank That Loaned to 
Landlord” Norwood News, Oct.9-22, 2003 
156 UNHP’s BIP listings show that Palazzolo-linked LLCs bought at least 22 buildings between March 1997, 
when 3569 DeKalb first came into his possession, and the 2002 fire. 
157 Interview: Gus Birru 3/15/07 
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to infer that the clamor for re-fi loans is also fueled by borrowers’ expectation, pervasive among 
seasoned investors, that building values will fall even if gentrification arrives. 
“The practice [of bundling buildings for mortgages] hasn’t been around that 
long, so I wouldn’t say it’s common. But banks have gotten much more 
aggressive about lending money – hard money lending and other lending. 
They’re willing to finance pretty much anything. So if a bank says yes, why say 
no, basically… What people are doing with that money [leveraged from 
buildings] varies – some people are doing developments in North Carolina with 
it. The banks don’t care; they’re happy to repossess the buildings if things don’t 
go well.”158 
 
For building owners who are purely investors, like Palazzolo, the survival of buildings 
themselves carries shockingly little weight. In 3569 DeKalb, as the tenants point out, it seems 
feasible that his intention was to have as little to do with the actual building as possible. If the 
building survived, it could be exchanged. If the building crumbled and the bank foreclosed, he still 
pocketed the cash from the loan. Because the value of the loan was so inflated, the loan-to-real value 
ratio was close enough to 100% or more that Palazzolo had effectively sold the building to the 
lender and walked away. 
The behavior of Palazzolo’s lender is also telling about investment strategy, and about 
channels for change. The loan appears to have originated with Dime Savings Bank and been 
refinanced by Washington Mutual, both major multifamily lenders in the Bronx.159 WaMu also made 
additional bundle-leveraged loans to the same owner, totaling around $60 million for 60 buildings.160 
Confronted by the organized tenants about dangerous conditions in their portfolio of Palazzolo 
buildings, according to Gus the WaMu officials first claimed there was nothing they could do, 
                                                
158 Interview: Manny Stein 4/11/07 
159 Title records as listed on PropertyShark.com 
160 Jordan and Wichert, 2003 
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“because they said he was paying his mortgage. Finally we came to the point 
where they agreed to at least talk to him. When they talked to him, the bank said 
they were going to send its own inspectors to the building, to make decisions 
about any further financing.”161 
After conducting inspections, WaMu relented and agreed to issue a default notice to Palazzolo based 
on a “good repair” clause in the loan.162 
 
443 Cyrus Place: “Strategic Disrepair” and Waiting for Gentrification 
443 Cyrus Place was purchased in 1999. The buyer, an LLC that owned two similar buildings 
nearby, appears to be a family-based partnership located in the Hasidic real estate business enclave 
of Brooklyn.163 Although in 2003 and 2005 the owners sold 443 Cyrus Place to another LLC they 
also apparently controlled,164 and mortgaged the building in the process, actual repairs performed on 
the building were minimal. The building had been in need of repair before the first purchase; HPD 
reports on a single apartment in 1996 show old, exposed wiring, defective bathtub and basins, 
cracking plaster and overdue painting. Other inspections in the years before the sale show lead paint, 
loose gas valves, sagging floors and other indicators of decay. Sporadic inspections over the few 
years after the sale show apartments getting worse – multiple B and C violations in each inspected 
apartment, increasing in severity to include pervasive leaks, garbage piling up and rampant rats. 165 
But around 2003, the maintenance strategy appears to have shifted. An inspection in 
November 2002 reveals nineteen B and C violations on a single apartment. A year later, inspection 
                                                
161 Interview: Gus Birru 3/15/07 
162 Moss, Jordan “Coalition: Washington Mutual Agrees to Inspect Palazzolo Buildings”, Norwood News Dec. 
18-31, 2003 
163 Gabriel Grunblatt is often listed as owner on permit documents (posted online by NYS DOB); Abe 
Grunblatt and ABGG Construction, at the same address, are listed as superintendents, contractors or owners; 
ABGG Construction is listed as the superintendent and contractor on DOB permit records for several other 
Hasidic/Brooklyn real estate investors. 
164 NYS Dept. of Corporations Entity Information online. 
165 Historical violations records as compiled on PropertyShark.com. 
 71 
reports show that the leaks and structural issues are apparently fixed, while habitability violations 
affecting the tenant more than the building – defective flooring, for example – are re-documented. 
This pattern persists. Apartments show multiple violations; violations that primarily hinder tenants’ 
daily lives persist from one inspection to the next, but violations affecting structural integrity are 
resolved.166 
Tenants believe that this change in maintenance strategy reflects the landlord’s intention to 
empty the building and convert it to cooperative or condominium apartments. Student-driven 
gentrification around nearby Fordham University, in combination with the increasing scarcity of for-
purchase apartments in Manhattan, makes this a credible idea. And in fact, tenants report that the 
owners began warehousing apartments as they were vacated by low-income tenants. By mid-2005, in 
a borough with less than 3% vacancy and an even greater shortage of rent-stabilized apartments, 443 
Cyrus Place had 19% vacancy.167 
The landlord and manager also began mounting pressure on existing tenants to leave, and 
pushing rents upward. 
“The building was being vandalized in every way, lots of delinquents in the 
building – they didn’t live here, although they acted like they did. There was 
graffiti and people coming into the apartments. We informed the manager that 
this was happening – sent him a letter detailing it – and he said ‘for better or 
worse, you can leave…’ They say this apartment should be renting for $1800 
anyway. But I have 25 years living in this apartment. Every two years the rent 
goes up by the amount it’s supposed to.”168 
 
The landlord’s pressure escalated over time. As described earlier, in 2004 the building 
manager sued Ada for an alleged nine years’ arrears. In a second instance, the manager wrote a 
                                                
166 Historical violations records as compiled on PropertyShark.com. 
167 According to tenants, 3 of 16 apartments were being held vacant at the time. 
168 Interview: Ada 3/23/07 
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renewal lease that illegally raised the rent, according to the organizer, from $600 to $1400. The 
tenant was subsidized by Section 8. “They did a sleight-of-hand on him – they reported to Section 8 
that they’d remodeled the apartment,” says Ada. Under New York State law, an illegally inflated rent 
can only be challenged for the first two years; after two years, the inflated rate is legalized, and 
becomes the basis for future increases. It’s unclear whether the tenant was even aware of the 
increase; or if he was, whether he was content to let the increase go through rather than grapple with 
the bureaucracy of Section 8 and DHCR, and risk endangering his housing. In this case, Section 8 
continued to pay the increased rent, and it was legalized.169 
In 2005, a fire gave the landlord the chance to empty the building of tenants. DOB issued a 
vacate order and the Red Cross placed the tenants in a long-stay hotel in the Bronx. (Meanwhile, 
tenants camped in their apartments during the day to thwart vandals.) After several months of 
inaction by the landlord, tenants arrived at the conclusion that the landlord did not intend to repair 
the building, and did not want them to return. They initiated action in Bronx housing court. 
As a result of tenants’ prolonged court action and creative legal strategies supported by a pro 
bono lawyer, the landlord did enough work to lift DOB’s vacate order. But the building was still 
essentially unlivable, and most of the Section 8 tenants appear to have been forced out by poor 
conditions that violated the terms of their subsidy. When the remaining tenants returned to housing 
court to try to further the repairs, they were hampered by the fact that the landlord claimed repairs 
were underway, and as “proof” he had secured work permits from the city. Finally, after joining 
forces with NWBCCC and an attorney from the Urban Justice Center, the tenants forced the 
landlord to perform actual repairs. Citibank, a mortgage-holder, apparently pressed the landlord to 
                                                
169 The policy of the NYC Housing Authority, which determines the maximum allowable rent for a Section 8 
voucher, is to approve “legal,” DHCR-determined rent on any rent-stabilized apartment. 
(http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/html/section8/lh_ll_faqs.shtml#q4) While a $1200 increase should 
certainly have been a red flag, DHCR does allow rent to jump enormously in cases where a preferential rent, 
below legal rent, was previously charged. Short of requesting DHCR documentation on individual 
apartments, NYCHA is not positioned to challenge illegal increases on Section 8 apartments. 
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rent out the vacant apartments as well, thwarting the plan to warehouse the building for a new set of 
more glamorous tenants. But the repairs have a questionable relationship to building codes, and 
pressures on tenants remain: 
“Thanks be to God, the remodeling finally did take place. Although at this point 
I feel a little disgusted… They changed the heat and hot water system [in each 
apartment.] Paragraph 6 of my lease says that the landlord is supposed to provide 
heat and hot water. But the way they set it up, it’s billed to our individual electric 
and gas bills, and it’s incredibly expensive… And they’re not done with the 
remodeling – they don’t want to be done. They want to keep going so we 
disappear.”170 
 
It’s clear that the landlord had plans for the building that did not include his long-term low-
income tenants, and was employing “selective disrepair” and maintenance deferrals as tactics to 
move his plans forward. It’s less clear what the landlord intended to do with the $1.18m refinancing 
loans, taken between 2003-2005 on the LLC’s three bundled properties.171 Certainly they had not 
been spent on repairing 443 Cyrus Place, nor were any plans or permits filed for either of the other 
two buildings. Although the loan is relatively small, it has the hallmarks of equity-draining, Bronx 
style. 
 
1920 Walton: The Antidote? Near-Term Investment 
1920 Walton was bought in the late 1990s by Baruch Singer, a notorious large-scale 
slumlord.172 Historical inspection records show few HPD visits to the building (the records may be 
                                                
170 Interview: Ada 3/23/07 
171 Title documents on PropertyShark.com. These listings provide minimal information other than transfers 
of ownership and the contracting of mortgages, so interpretation is required. 
172 “NYC’s Worst Landlords”, Housing Here & Now 2006/Date of sale: PropertyShark.com lists several 
transfers of the building between 1996 and 2003. 2003 is the known purchase date by the current 
owner/manager, Manny Stein. Singer’s purchase date is not clearly identifiable, but falls between 1996-1998. 
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incomplete), but the violations listed indicate that the building was in need of repair. Around the 
same time, tenants set out to improve their conditions, and succeeded in getting “to the point where 
DHCR was fining him for things that didn’t get repaired”173 – an achievement that indicates that the 
building was deeply substandard and the landlord was under unusual scrutiny. 
By 2000, the landlord had signed the building up for a city subsidy program which aimed to 
alleviate overcrowding in the shelter system by using private, mostly rent-regulated apartments as 
shelter space. Circumventing the mandatory one- or two-year lease regulation, the NYC Department 
of Homeless Services (DHS) directly rented apartments by the day. Monthly rents for DHS 
apartments, which were also furnished by the landlord, totaled up to $3000.174 According to tenants, 
the landlord began to renovate vacant apartments in order to rent them to DHS175 while failing to 
make even basic repairs to other apartments – even those with other subsidies. 
“What was happening here was that Barry was trying to empty the building of legitimate 
tenants in order to put in DHS… We didn’t want to put out the homeless, it’s just that we 
wanted [the landlord] to do the same for us. Everything was brand new in those apartments, 
and for us they wouldn’t fix a hole in the wall.”176 
 
At the same time, drug dealers setting up shop in multiple apartments challenged tenancies – 
by creating danger and, more directly, by offering tenants cash to move out and turn over their 
apartments to dealers’ use. 
While tenants organized to end the DHS practice, rout drug dealers and secure some repairs, 
both the physical integrity and the population of the building changed. Unattended leaks and floods 
weakened the structure and brought rats through to the upper floors; old wiring, windows and other 
                                                
173 Interview: Willia McKeiver 3/23/07 
174 Scattered Dreams, 2004 (information obtained from DHS by FOIA request.) 
175 In Scattered Dreams, advocates note that DHS did not enforce minimum standards for apartments it rented; 
so the landlord’s repairs to DHS-rented apartments appears to have been a maintenance investment rather 
than an honoring of obligations to tenants.  
176 Interview: Willia McKeiver 3/23/07 
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issues compounded habitability problems. The tenant population became poorer and more likely to 
be doubled- and tripled-up in apartments. Tenants also came and went more frequently than in the 
past – possibly because more were using portable subsidies to pay for their apartments – so 
apartments became significantly more expensive through vacancy increases. 
The tenants and NWBCCC carried out a long-term organizing effort in conjunction with 
other Singer buildings. Bringing pressure to bear from the city and Singer’s lenders, they forced him 
to sell the 84-unit building, complete with 1,100 outstanding violations. Although the current 
manager/owner, Manny Stein, has appeared on the “NYC’s Worst Landlords” list himself, tenants 
report that he visits the building daily, has made some long-awaited repairs, and generally “will do it 
if you speak up.”177 
Stein – the only case study landlord who agreed to be interviewed – describes an approach to 
his bruised, battered building that appears to be the opposite of equity-draining, capital storage and 
deferred maintenance. 
“I’ve been in this business bordering on a decade. [In my portfolio] each building 
has to stand up on its own two feet [which means repairing it up front]… We 
might sell a building after a year if it’s not working out like we thought, if the 
problems are a lot deeper than we thought. We’re not in the business of 
improving the world. 
 
“With 1920 Walton I practically lived in it. Normally I’d take a slower approach, 
do a boiler, do a few apartments – but so much needed to be done that we 
attacked it all at once… In terms of deep repairs to the building, we did whatever 
structural stuff was recommended by the engineers we brought in.”178 
 
                                                
177 Interview: “Jane” 3/23/07 
178 Interview: Manny Stein 4/11/07 
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Stein’s funding comes from New York Community Bank (NYCB), and he represents the 
loan that NYCB’s senior lender, Jim Carpenter, says is typical in his multifamily portfolio: 
“Our typical borrower profile is a guy that buys a building, works the rent roll, 
gets illegal tenants out… Just get the apartment to peak rental value. That’s done 
through tenant turnover, renovations… The market still might not bear full legal 
rent after renovations, so you don’t over-renovate either. 
 
“We don’t lend to a guy that… just came into some cash… and we’re not 
looking to lend to someone who’s just going to milk a building. We look to 
people that own and manage real estate as their primary livelihood. Do they have 
management experience? Can they deal with human and labor issues?”179 
 
So what’s money doing in the Bronx? 
The business of Bronx building ownership is characterized by two sets of strategies: 
investors’ and lenders’. Investors’ strategies vary from Palazzolo-style equity-draining to “waiting for 
gentrification” to actual stewardship, but so much opportunity exists for free money that it a profit-
driven large-scale investor (or an broker charged with investing other people’s money to produce a 
return) would be hard pressed to eschew it. Lenders’ strategies are slightly more focused on 
maintaining the buildings as sources of income, but they too are structured to insulate lenders from 
the vagaries of real-world housing. 
NYCB is a major Bronx lender with a portfolio representing about one-quarter of the sales 
listed in UNHP data since 1996. And in fact, NYCB is described as “an extremely conservative 
lender who has never had to write off a loan,”180 a success that seems at least partly based on 
implementing requirements about building quality. But most lenders use a “good repair” clause, 
including Washington Mutual, another major multifamily lender in the Bronx – and they ended up 
                                                
179 Interview: Jim Carpenter 4/19/07 
180 Interview: Felice Gelman 5/17/07 
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with Frank Palazzolo and 3569 DeKalb. Other securitized lenders, who sell loans shortly after 
making them, simply “never get a good window on who the owner is; [as far as they’re concerned] 
that’s the servicer’s problem.”181 
Diligence about building loans is made additionally difficult by the unbundling of lending 
functions in the secondary mortgage market, which muddies loan supervision; and by the plain 
difficulty of continuing physical inspections over time. As a matter of general practice, mortgages are 
packaged into bonds and sold in such a way that the loans are essentially anonimized and the holders 
insulated from default.182 Accordingly, when Jim Buckley worked to convince lenders to pay closer 
attention to their failing buildings, some banks’ portfolios were so large that they “weren’t that 
concerned about a ‘worst case scenario’ in just a few buildings.”183 UNHP has been able to take 
some banks on tours of their own buildings and finally elicit some response. But most lenders – like 
WaMu in the case of 3569 DeKalb – are primarily monitoring mortgage payments rather than 
buildings. 
Worse, although Carpenter thinks that roof-to-basement inspections and violations checks 
on landlords are becoming more standard, he acknowledges that the prevailing structure of 
mortgage lending simply precludes market-wide safeguards. 
“With so much cash floating around, everyone has a different approach to 
inspecting. We’ve terminated loan applications because of inspections, but the 
deal always finds a home. The brokers who initially came to us will tell us they 
got it done… It’s too easy for the wrong guys to buy.”184 
 
                                                
181 Interview: Jim Carpenter 4/19/07 
182 According to bank analyst Felice Gelman, loans are typically bundled into pools of similar loans valued at 
$200m or more. The bundles are divided into bonds of varying credit quality and sold to institutional 
investors or mutual funds. Income from the loans pays the top-rated bonds first, so defaults even in the top-
rated category are only felt by the bottom tier of bondholders. 
183 Interview: Jim Buckley 4/9/07 
184 Interview: Jim Carpenter 4/19/07 
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Fortunately, that current may now be shifting. Although lenders have “capitalized and run” 
on many buildings which now have essentially no regulatory supervision, title records show that 
since 2003 conventional banks have almost entirely replaced mortgage brokers as lenders on Bronx 
buildings. And though conventional banks also sell their loans and are not necessarily directly 
accountable for them, watchdog groups are having increasing success in using media and pressure 
campaigns to induce them not just to pay closer attention, but to use their contracts as leverage to 
require repairs. This is reflected in the increasing frequency of building inspections and violations 
checks by lenders, although some bank lenders are still resistant to the idea that their gentrification-
targeted loans are actually funding slumlords.185 
But the gentrification/upside approach to Bronx investing still seems to be shared across 
banks, if not by entrenched landlords like Anelante and Stein. In spite of the clear role of 1031 
exchanges in inflating prices, for example, even NYCB makes loans based on the expectation that 
borrowers can push rents up high enough to support the sale cost – “by about 25% [above 
scheduled rent increases] on many apartments,” through vacancy increases, renovation and 
deregulation.186 As a result, lenders are agreeing to take on the most desperate buildings which 
collectively house the poorest people in New York City. And even if their intention is to install 
owners who will operate the building in good faith rather than equity-draining, they’re still making 
loans on buildings they may not thoroughly understand – loans that are fundamentally speculative. 
In particular, they risk making loans that presume the building is in better shape than it is, and which 
rely heavily on appreciation that may never occur in the inflated Bronx market. In an arena with 
inexperienced investors, high prices that encourage cosmetic patch-and-flip sales, and maintenance 
                                                
185 Jim Buckley relates one lender’s response to UNHP’s suggestion that they tour the building in order to 
really understand the growth potential of the property: “A bizarre story is a guy from WaMu who accused us 
of being ‘against professionals’ [because we were saying] the numbers don’t work – that rents can’t be that 
high. He said we were condemning the neighborhood to being forever poor.” (Interview: Jim Buckley 
4/9/07) 
186 Interview: Jim Carpenter 4/19/07 
 79 
plans that include putting off repairs now and funding repairs later with profits that don’t yet exist, 
current lending promises to breed future crisis. 
 
The gentrification approach includes two major, questionable gambles: that the housing 
stock will survive the deferrals, and that low-income tenants will cooperate by leaving. The non-
gentrification “paper investment” approach, contains a separate gamble: that even as buildings 
deteriorate, prices will stay high enough to support future exchanges. Observers who don’t buy the 
gentrification outcome predict an outcome in which “a lot of investors are going to lose their 
money.”187 But the gamblers’ risk is not limited to themselves. The deferral of maintenance, whether 
by landlords waiting for an upturn in building revenues or by non-managing 1031 investors, poses a 
real risk to the housing stock of abandonment or physical “destruction through non-repair”188; and 
to the tenants who already have no alternative housing. And in the absence of a more activist 
regulatory system, lenders, investors, buildings and tenants are pretty much alone in this 
uncontrolled experiment on a major public resource. As the following chapter lays out, by the 
current path the odds don’t look great for investors. But for the tenants, there may yet be solutions.
                                                
187 This theme was repeated by multiple interviewees, including Jim Buckley, Manny Stein, Frank Anelante 
and Felice Gelman. 
188 Sternlieb & Burchell, 1973 
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CHAPTER 6 
WHAT HAPPENS IF EVERYTHING STAYS THE SAME? 
 
 The “success” of the Bronx housing gambles depends on three factors: how 
buildings weather the deferral of attention; whether poor tenants really leave, making room for 
vacancy increases, remodeling and substantive neighborhood change; and whether investors reach 
the point, when neither holding nor operating the buildings is profitable, when they begin to walk 
away. This chapter investigates each of those possibilities. What condition are the buildings really in, 
and what can we know about where they’re headed? Will tenants find a way to hang on? Might 
stronger reasons come up to leave than to stay? Is there a scenario in which the buildings lose their 
investment glamour but aren’t abandoned? And given these paths, what resources are available or 
missing for the task of shepherding this crucial housing stock? 
Since the regulatory system’s information about buildings’ physical condition is spotty and 
uncompiled, and investment behavior is patchy and secretive, much of this is speculation. But the 
history of low-income neighborhood change is long enough now to show trends and possibilities. 
To assess whether the buildings might survive long-term disrepair strategies, this chapter 
uses the knowledge gained from the case studies to examine at a 1% sample of buildings sold in the 
last decade. While the case studies provide a close-up view of a few distressed buildings, the sample 
is intended to check whether those buildings are really representative of the larger stock. Additional 
criteria for evaluating the sample come from the regulatory records of a building that actually did 
partially collapse. This building provides a historical snapshot of the regulatory record of a building 
that was proven to be nearing structural crisis, which gives a basis for analyzing the records of other 
buildings whose risk is not fully known. This examination yields information about the regulatory 
system as well, and an analysis of gaps in information and enforcement is included. 
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To understand whether tenants might stay or go, it assesses the means by which tenants 
could hang on, as well as the impact on tenants of leaving.  And to spin a prediction for what might 
happen when the market deflates, it looks at current efforts underway to prepare for that eventuality. 
Together, these investigations hint at possible endpoints for the current trajectory of the Bronx.  
 
Part 1: Figuring out whether buildings will make it 
 The case study buildings provide a useful set of indicators for buildings in trouble. The 
knowledge is less formal than HPD’s violation rankings or UNHP’s Building Indicators Project, but 
perhaps more attuned to the dynamics of landlord approach, tenant capacity to advocate for 
building quality, and even depth of repair needs. First, they provide evidence that issues like leaks 
and mold, which are listed as B violations in HPD’s code (“hazardous,” but not immediately 
hazardous) may be better indicators of building risk than C violations (which are “immediately 
hazardous.”) While many housing reports use C violations as a measure of poor building quality,189 C 
violations pertain mostly to the immediate lives of tenants. For example, peeling lead paint, a C 
violation, is a serious threat to the safety of tenants. But in the case study buildings, leaks, mold, 
sagging floors and old wiring were not only indicators of current building conditions, but of 
landlords’ more long-term disengagement from stewardship. B violations may provide a better 
indication of long-term structural risk – especially if they have increased significantly since the sale 
of the building. 
 Other factors, also not included in regulatory evaluations of risk but at least referenced in 
many housing quality reports, similarly suggest long-term danger. From the case studies, these 
include the failure of regulators to visit buildings at all, which suggests in part that tenants are unable 
                                                
189 Virtually every report on housing conditions cited here uses C violations as an indicator of extreme 
distress. 
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to advocate for building quality; and the existence of complaints about structural problems, 
registered with DOB, that are repeatedly called in by tenants but unconfirmed by inspectors. 
 Finally, a risk factor offered less directly by the case studies is the illegal use of buildings to 
leverage profit, as with illegal basement conversions; or the use of building space for legal “extra” 
profit in the absence of other stewardship. (This is exemplified in the sample by the conversion of 
apartments into “communications rooms”, which are essentially outposts for cell phone equipment, 
in buildings where apartments occupied by people are in poor condition.) 
Using these structural, regulatory and milking cues as guidelines, I did what a regulatory 
system might ideally do: I looked hard at some buildings’ histories of decay, landlords’ practices in 
dealing with problems, and tenants’ voices in describing the problems they see. My sample is tiny, 
only 18 buildings (the case study buildings are not included.) And the information available to me 
about each building is limited to records available on the internet. But it’s enough to perform a 
reasonable demonstration. 
The UNHP Building Indicators Project lists 4,663 buildings that fit the description of the 
standard Bronx pre-war multifamily building. To get to the buildings held by new investors, I 
narrowed down the pool to buildings that have been sold between 1996 and the present: a pool of 
1,825 buildings. From among them I pulled 18 random buildings, about a 1% sample. 190 In the 
process, I noted whether they appeared to have been sold in a bundle.191 Three sources of records 
helped describe each building. 
 
                                                
190 Randomizing method: each building record was assigned a number, then a randomizer (www.random.org) 
was used to select record numbers. 
191 How I identified a bundled sale: if several buildings were sold on the same date, I tracked the buyer of the 
other buildings. In many cases, the buyer was the same (although sales were often made to nominally separate 
LLCs.) This is accurate for confirming that certain buildings were sold as a bundle, but not for disproving 
anything. There may be instances where sales were bundled, but my research didn’t turn up the connection 
between them.  
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• PropertyShark.com, a data compilation service which uses proprietary (unrevealed) methods 
to pull data from public sources on title documents, HPD violations history, neighborhood 
statistics, etc. The HPD violations history is a critical piece of data that is not available in 
HPD’s own online records; on HPD’s website, violations are expunged as they are resolved. 
PropertyShark.com’s history of violations gives a much more complete picture of what a 
building has been through, and what might still lurk underneath cosmetic patching. It also 
gives a sense of which apartments are calling for inspections – is it the same tenant 
repeatedly? Does HPD really have information about what’s going on building-wide? 
PropertyShark.com also posts photos of most buildings, which adds much-needed context. 
 
• NYC Buildings Information System, which posts DOB and Environmental Control Board 
(ECB) violations, as well as permit requests and approvals. This site also posts the raw text 
of complaints – meaning, the phone message that a DOB employee took as the tenant 
explained what was wrong. These messages are probably the most human documentation 
available in the public record, short of court transcripts. Raw complaints also fill in details of 
potential building problems that never make it into the official record, since inspectors 
frequently report that they can’t gain access to a building to assess a complaint. 
 
• HPD’s violations database, which shows which violations are still open (after how many 
years), and which buildings HPD inspectors have not revisited. 
 
The 1% sample  
The sample makes some strong statements about the buildings’ condition. First, 67% of 
buildings show immediate maintenance risk, including 28% of the total whose record of decay and 
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lack of record of repair suggest they’re in danger right now. Second, only 17% of the buildings have 
experienced any concerted structural rehab on record – the other 83% are more or less coasting on 
the quality of their original construction and subsequent stewardship. Third, it suggests a connection 
between leaks and mold (which the regulatory system often treats as lesser “habitability issues”) and 
serious structural problems: 75% of the buildings that showed pervasive leaks and mold also showed 
cracking foundations and/or façades. 
Only a handful, 22%, show a serious decline since being sold during “the craze.” (They match 
almost exactly the roster of buildings that show signs of equity-draining or milking practices by their 
owners. These practices include frequent refinancing, but also physical milking practices like creating 
illegal basement SROs. The physical version is much more common in the sample.) While only a 
small proportion of the sample, these buildings illustrate the possibility of fast onset of risk. The 
large proportion of housing stock that has been recently sold, facing unknown risk in the hands of 
new landlords with a new approach to ownership, could feasibly decline en masse. That said, the 
“serious decline since sale” buildings include only one that was purchased as part a bundle; other 
bundled-sale buildings range from “maintaining bad conditions” to “relatively okay.” So purchase by 
a larger investor of the sort currently buying up bundles of investment properties does not 
necessarily point either to physical downturn or improvement. All we learn about profiteering is that 
it can destroy buildings, and that some of the new investors are profiteers. 
The sample also confirms that the regulatory system knows very little about buildings. In 
many cases, tenant calls about structural issues were never documented in violations when 
inspectors often couldn’t get in to the building or the basement. Others were rejected with “no 
action necessary based on observation” – and some of those were followed up by inspections that 
did find the problem after all. Inspections also find the same issues over and over, and reports often 
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don’t reflect the previous finding, or the unpaid fine outstanding for the same violation; nor do they 
seem to note the many years over which violations go uncured. 
In other words, the limited information available suggests that most of the buildings do not 
face any new threat to survival in the hands of their new owners. But the stability of non-
maintenance does not remove the danger, since non-maintenance over time increases the risk that 
buildings won’t survive. One recent structural collapse illustrates this possibility. 
THE SAMPLE: 
1% of Bronx pre-war multifamily buildings sold during The Craze 
 
Sources: 
PS: www.PropertyShark.com (building records accessed 4/5/07 and 4/6/07) 
HPD: NYC Dept. of Housing Preservation & Development building records, online at http://167.153.4.71/Hpdonline/provide_address.aspx (accessed 4/5/07 and 4/6/07) 
BIS: NYC Buildings Information System, online at http://a810-bisweb.nyc.gov/bisweb/bsqpm01.jsp (accessed 4/5/07 and 4/6/07) 
Sample consists of 18 buildings drawn randomly from UNHP-compiled Win2Data, from pool of buildings sold since 1/1/96, using record numbers assigned to buildings in descending order of sale date. 
* Photos: Gregg Snodgrass as posted on www.PropertyShark.com 
** Photos: NYC Dept. of Finance as posted on www.PropertyShark.com 
 
 RAND
# BLDG SALE DATE SLEUTHING NOTES PHOTO ASSESSMENT 
1 1091 1520 GRAND CONCOURSE 2/1/01 Mount Eden; Mortgage-free since 2004; 2006 HPD visit found 14 
violations on one apt, mostly B, some A & C – leaks, mold, broken 
window sash, broken plaster, mice, roaches, no paint, confirmed lead 
paint; no previous HPD visits listed till 1998, then 1994, then 1989 (PS) 
 
No DOB action, just replacement of boiler in 2003 (BIS) 
 
Most violations listed in 1984 and 1987 were relisted in 2001 as “not 
complied”’ no apparent contact with the building between 2001 and 2006 
(HPD violations site)  
 
Source: * 
Maintenance risk 
Unregulated 
 
• Structural cues: 
o Pervasive leaks/mold 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
• Regulatory cues: 
o Minimal HPD contact, few apts reporting 
o No DOB contact (except ’03 boiler permit) 
 
2 1405 813 FAILE ST 12/6/97 Hunts Point; Sold to CE Mgmt by HPD w/ funding from HDFC; 
previously appears to be family owned & inherited; transferred to HPD in 
1977; no HPD violations listed on PS. (PS) – possibly was vacant from at 
least 1977 to 1996? 
 
No HPD violations listed – still vacant? But current owner is “private”. 
(HPD) 
 
Still no CofO as of 1998; boiler violated in 2001 but cured in 2004 after 
2nd violation; major rehab of building in 1996 was done by HPD, and 
included “partial replacement of wood joists and partitions, new partitions, 
new kitchen and bathrooms, new ceiling assemblies, new wall and floor 
finishes, new electrical and plumbing systems.” (BIS) 
 
 
 
 
Source: ** 
Some maintenance risk 
Unregulated 
 
• Structural cues 
o HPD did major structural rehab in 1996 
• Regulatory cues: 
o No HPD contact since 1996 
o No DOB contact 
o If not vacant, completely off HPD’s map 
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3 955 2810 OLINVILLE AVE 11/26/02 Pelham Parkway area; may have been resold but Win2Data missed the 
sale; new UCC1 in 2004 and 2006, looks like partial refi in 2006 ($800,000) 
with SF, CA division of Citibank. Looks like bldg was family owned, 
involved in estates/inheritances from 1980s-2000; 2006 HPD inspection 
shows 14 violations on a single apt., including lots of stuff broken – 
cabinets, stove/pilot light, plaster, leaks, mold, no paint, etc.; apt, in 
another line had just 5 violations in 2006; mostly B violations except for 
mold; no apparent visits between 2006 and 1998. Earlier violations were 
mostly about lead paint (seems to have been remediated) and 
mice/roaches. (PS) 
 
Vermin reconfirmed 2003 (HPD) 
 
New owner tried to do illegal conversion of basement in 2006, got stop 
work order for unpermitted & hazardous construction in 2007, also found 
bsmt still converted; boiler is currently violated; failure to maintain orders 
in 2007 cites “large pools of standing water… actually touches bottom of 
[cut off]”; $5000 in fines unpaid/default; created telecommunications 
room in 2005 (DOB) 
NO 
PHOTO Maintenance risk 
Milking risk 
Poorly regulated 
 
• Milking cues: 
o Landlord-initiated illegal conversions 
o Telecommunication room conversion 
• Structural cues: 
o Evidence of decline since sale 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
o Leaks/mold 
o Standing water violation 
• Regulatory cues: 
o HPD inspects some apts occasionally 
o Structural violations uncured/re-cited 
  
4 919 3029 BRIGGS AV 3/26/03 Bedford Park; Bought by individual investor in 1986, operated by estate 
for through 1991 or so; NYCB is current financer; 2006 violations include 
one apt with 22 violations, mostly Bs; only C violations are lead paint; 
violations show multiple small repairs – broken piece of floor by radiator, 
leaky faucets, broken window sash, etc. Violations in 2003 (before 
purchase) were mostly Bs, also multiple small repairs, plaster, cabinet 
doors, etc. Violations go back this way to 1985; hardly any C violations 
ever, and no structural ones. (PS) 
 
HPD & DOB – nothing to speak of. (HPD, BIS) 
 
Source: ** 
Some maintenance risk 
Poorly regulated 
 
• Structural cues: 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
• Regulatory cues: 
o HPD inspects some apts occasionally 
o No DOB action (no tenant-reported issues) 
 
5 1553 2123-25 TIEBOUT AVE  12/24/96 
(bundle) 
Mount Hope/Fordham, looks like it went partially co-op in 1998, but still 
has lots of stabilized renters; almost no action at all since 2003; lots and 
lots of B violations in the last few years, including leaks, sloping floors, 
mice, lead paint, broken tiles and plaster. Older violations include illegal 
alterations (subdividing apts.) (PS) 
 
Lots of apts with mold, some apt-wide repairs ordered to windows, etc. 
(HPD) 
 
DOB complaint about “storing refrigerators and stoves in building 
hallway of 4th floor” sounds like moderate rehab is going on; 2005 
violation cited construction and also missing mortar and parapet in danger 
of collapse; no recent structural work permits issued (BIS) 
 Source: ** 
Maintenance risk 
Milking risk 
Poorly regulated 
 
• Milking cues: 
o Rehab of apartments but no remediation of 
structural dangers 
• Structural cues: 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
o Leaks/mold 
o Parapets in danger of collapse 
• Regulatory cues: 
o Structural violations uncured/no work permits 
requested 
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6 1028 2420 BRONX PARK EAST 11/8/01 Pelham Park; very likely family-owned since 1970, inherited a few times, 
probably still in the hands of the inheritor; plenty of current violations, 
mostly paint & plaster, some lead paint; also a fair number of structural 
ones: some leaks and mold; broken/missing marble, defective mortar 
joints, mice & roaches; per-unit violations increase from ~3 to ~8 over 
time; re-fi in 2002, 2004 (PS) 
 
2006 DOB structural complaints (“unable to ascertain apartment in 
question”) about ceiling cracking, building shaking, etc.; old wiring, fuses 
constantly blow; elevator “constantly” defective` 
 
Source: ** 
Serious maintenance risk 
Poorly regulated 
 
• Structural cues: 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
o Leaks/mold 
o Defective mortar joints 
o DOB complaints of cracking/shaking 
o DOB complaints about old wiring 
• Regulatory cues: 
o Relatively frequent HPD visits, but inspections 
still only report on 6 apts 
o DOB complaints unverified 
 
7 913 1997 HUGHES AVE  4/30/03 Belmont; had structural work done in 2001, 2003 – replace window lintels 
(initially no permit/stop work – new owner, shortly after purchase), 
replace/repair parapet wall, etc. Lots of upkeep issues: broken tile, bad 
joins of window sashes, basins etc., broken plaster, etc. Apts inspected 
show multiple violations each – avg maybe 9? Also multiple leaks and 
mold. Lots of “illegal partition” violations; prior to 2003 only 2 visits 
recorded. (PS) 
 
2007 DOB complaints report fire in one line, concerns about stability; 
inspection notes “wood floors sagging & joists are sinking throughout” 
(BIS) 
 
  
 Source: ** 
Maintenance risk 
 
• Milking cues: 
o Multiple “illegal partition” violations (could be 
tenant-initiated) 
• Structural cues: 
o Structural maintenance (initially unpermitted) 
performed after purchase 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
o Leaks/mold 
o Sagging floors/joists 
• Regulatory cues: 
o DOB violations are uncured (but recent) 
 
8 1268 2208 WALTON AVE  12/7/98 Fordham/University Heights; lots of B violations about toilets, 
plaster/paint, pervasive water leaks, valves, electrical outlets, light fixtures, 
etc. Mold, sloping floor, illegal partition/conversion, missing tile, missing 
marble saddle, broken flooring, many lead paint violations remaining in 
2006 (concentrated in one apt reporting); rats, mice and roaches. Building 
has an extensive history of B violations (and many C) back to mid-80s. 
1996-97 were bad years for the building, accumulation of many 
maintenance issues. Not much action again until 2003 (maybe owner took 
care of stuff at first?), but by 2006 it had picked up again, still bad through 
2007. Looks like the building was re-fied in 2002. (PS) 
 
Most violations are disposition “no access” or “not complied” (HPD) 
 
DOB violated for failure to maintain (“windows are very old/rusted”) in 
2000; in 1990 DOB violated for failure to maintain exterior wall because 
parapet was leaning. Violation never resolved, $1000 fine “written off.” 
No permits on file at all. (BIS) 
 
Source: ** 
Serious maintenance risk 
Milking risk 
Poorly regulated 
 
• Milking cues: 
o Landlord-initiated illegal conversions 
• Structural cues: 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
o Evidence of decline since sale 
o Leaks/mold 
o Sloping floors 
o Failure to maintain exterior wall 
o Deep historical decay 
• Regulatory cues: 
o HPD violations are uncured 
o DOB violations are uncured/no work permits 
requested/fines unpaid 
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9 1746 830-50 REV. JAMES A 
POLITE AVE 
4/2/96 
(bundle) 
Hunts Point/Intervale Ave.; mortgage cleared 2004, no further leveraging. 
Repiped entire building for gas 2002. Only one apt inspected in 2007, but 
8 B violations (1 A, 1 C) including mold, broken surfaces paint/plaster, 
lead paint. Same story going back to 2005 – 1 or 2 apts inspected, multiple 
Bs. Rats. Not really getting worse over time, but clearly limited 
maintenance. Earlier violations are the same. 2-year period after purchase 
shows no inspections at all, but when they resume, it’s bad again. (PS) 
 
No DOB action since 2002. Boiler violation was actually paid in 1999. But 
that’s it – it’s like this building is empty. (BIS)  
Source: ** 
Some maintenance risk 
Poorly regulated 
 
• Structural cues: 
o Major repairs since purchase (repiping) 
o Some evidence of non-maintenance 
• Regulatory cues: 
o Minimal contact with HPD; few apts reporting 
o No contact with DOB 
10 1646 2505 OLINVILLE AVE 8/2/96 Pelham Parkway. Major refi in 1999, 2006; complicated fiscal history from 
1980s onward – families, maybe investment groups. Inspections show one 
apt per year, with about 11 violations, mostly Bs. Leaks, broken stuff, no 
painting, vermin, etc. Many fewer in 2003, 2004 – more to do with water 
services. (PS) 
 
DOB complaints include illegal basement conversion 2007, and water 
coming through brick into apt, 2001 (not confirmed), exact same 
complaint 1998 and “complainant feels bldg is structurally unsound.”  
Referred to HPD. Long-term failure to maintain elevator. No work 
permits filed for structural anything. (BIS) 
 
Source: ** 
Serious maintenance risk 
Poorly regulated 
 
• Milking cues: 
o Multiple re-fis 
o Landlord-intiated illegal conversions 
• Structural cues: 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
o Evidence of recent decline (coinciding with 
latest re-fi) 
o Multi-year complaints of water enering building 
through brick 
• Regulatory cues: 
o Minimal contact with HPD; few apts reporting 
o DOB structural complaints unverified over 3 
years 
o No work permits requested 
 
11 1134 1842 ARTHUR AVE  6/27/00 Belmont; no records (PS) 
 
One (open) violation listed for each year 2004-2006: one water leak, two 
requests for sprinkler reports. Maybe the building is in great condition. 
(HPD) 
 
1996 retaining wall is leaning and maybe collapsed; 1996 HPD was 
respondent for this one: “Failure to maintain the rear rubblestone 
retaining wall. The first retaining wall span[s] approx. 40 ft. and ranges in 
heigh from 2ft-6ft. This wall is pushed out approx. 7” and there are cracks 
at several loca[tions.]” Affadavit accepted. Still listed by BIS as “city-
owned” in 2002, (this is given as reason for dismissing a boiler violation) 
although sale date is listed at 2000. (BIS)  Source: ** 
Unknown maintenance risk 
Unregulated 
 
• Regulatory cues: 
o Minimal contact with HPD 
o No contact with DOB since 2002 
o DOB incorrectly lists building as city-owned 
(which is cause for dismissal of violations) 
 
12 666 3040 HULL AVE  9/2/04 Bainbridge; lots of Bs violations, incl one apt with 19 – broken plaster, 
tiles, water leaks, mold. No info between 1987 and 2005. (PS) 
 
DOB records show no action at all. (BIS) 
 
Charlie Celaj building (HPD) 
 
Source: ** 
Some maintenance risk 
Poorly regulated 
 
• Structural cues: 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
• Regulatory cues: 
o Minimal (but increasing) contact with HPD 
o No contact with DOB 
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13 1591 83 W 188TH ST  11/8/96 
(bundle) 
University Heights; 2002 major structural work: repiping of water and gas 
lines, renovated bathrooms, new bathroom floors and joist replacements 
in all apts. Also repaired parapet wall and steel window lintels. But 
building may now be in disrepair – lots of Bs including exposed electricals 
and other general non-maintenance, lots of lead paint. No HPD reports at 
all between 1998 and 2005. Building was pretty dire before that. (PS) 
 
Source: ** 
Some maintenance risk 
Poorly regulated 
 
• Structural cues: 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
• Regulatory cues: 
o Minimal (but increasing) contact with HPD 
o No contact with DOB 
 
14 1477 774 GRAND CONCOURSE 6/5/97 
(bundle) 
Highbridge/Courthouse; 2007 showed 13 violations on one apt., mostly B 
– paint, plaster, toilet broken, radiator valve, broken floor, fire retardant 
pulled from ceiling; another apt. 14 violations, mostly A, having to do with 
lack of painting; 2004 11 violations on one apt. mostly A, just stuff broken 
in apt and not attended to (like Bs, but less severe) Fair number of 
exposed and broken electricals; numerous apts with illegal partitions; 1999 
more decay stuff – missing marble, sagging floors, etc.; earlier (pre-
purchase) violations look much the same, but include lots of rats. Only 
one leak ever cited. (PS) 
 
DOB complaints include floor sinking 4-5 inches for multiple apts in a 
line (was assessed in 1995, along with crack in foundation wall – affidavit 
of repair accepted; but new complaints 1999, never assessed); cracks had 
also been found & violated in 1994 on a different line, and note says 
“cracks repaired n.a.n. (no action necessary)” (BIS) 
 
Most violations still open (HPD) 
 
Source: * 
Maintenance risk 
Poorly regulated 
 
• Milking cues: 
o Multiple “illegal partition” violations (could be 
tenant-initiated) 
• Structural cues: 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
o Sinking floors & cracking on multiple 
apartment lines 
o “Repaired” structural violations re-cited again 
later 
• Regulatory cues: 
o HPD violations uncured 
o DOB structural complaints unverified 
 
15 670 2538 VALENTINE AVE  8/17/04 Bedford Park; no HPD reports dated after 2001; mostly Bs about 
paint/plaster, and Cs about lack of hot water; some mold/damp that does 
not get re-violated after 1991 (PS) 
 
DOB complaint 2005 cites improper drainage (not confirmed); 2004 
complaint cites faulty wiring, shorts, sparks (not confirmed. 2 complaints 6 
months apart); 1999 cites unpermitted plumbing work (unconfirmed); 
persistently non-working elevator (BIS) 
 
No listed violations after 2001 (HPD) 
 
Source: ** 
Maintenance risk 
Unregulated 
 
• Structural cues: 
o Some evidence of non-maintenance (given 
minimal information available) 
o Serious complaints to DOB 
• Regulatory cues: 
o No HPD contact since 2001 
o No DOB complaints ever verified 
 
16 591 4359 FURMAN AVE 1/14/05 Wakefield; sold again 4/19/07; 2007 violations show lots of Bs, including 
structural clues: inadequate cold water, mold in multiple apartments, 
defective windows, concealed and cascading leaks in multiple lines, 
defective water line connections of sink & toilet. Leaks persist over at least 
3 years. (PS) 
 
DOB – 2005 complaint about fuses constantly blowing was unverified 
(BIS) 
 
HPD violations pretty much unanswered, all still current (HPD) 
NO 
PHOTO Maintenance risk 
Poorly regulated 
 
• Structural cues: 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
o Major, persistent leaks in multiple apartment 
lines 
• Regulatory cues: 
o HPD violations uncured 
o Minimal DOB contact 
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17 26 480 CONCORD AVE  2/1/07 
(bundle – 
usurious 
Delaware co.) 
Mott Haven; previous lender was NYCB/Roslyn Savings Bank, since 
2004. Lots and lots of violations, mostly A (painting) but some 
B/structural: water leaks on multiple lines of apartments, exposed wiring 
in multiple places. General upkeep looks bad: paint, plaster, no smoke 
detectors, no monoxide detectors, defective faucets, mice, rats and 
roaches, etc. 2006 C violation for eroded brick and mortar joints at roof 
on entire façade of building. Padlocked fire egress, etc. Number of 
violations is massive beginning in 2003; before that, apts that got 
inspected only show a few violations each. (PS) 
 
DOB found “no action necessary” on complaint that electricals blow out 
constantly in 2006; 2006 structural violation (missing bricks & mortar) 
noted in response to tenant complaint – same violation issued in 2005 (at 
that time, owner’s affadavit of cure was accepted). But earlier in 2005, an 
inspector looked at same problem and saw “no defect, no collapsing of 
parapet wall at time of inspection; previously violated in 2000 as well 
(affadavit accepted), previous complaint about leaning wall in 2004 
dismissed as “no action necessary”; 2006 violation for illegal conversion 
(also previously violated in 2001); 2005 failure to maintain on elevator 
(more severe than the usual). Illegal partitions/illegal kitchen & bathroom 
violated in both 2001 and 2006, disposition “no compliance” (BIS) 
 
HPD says most violations are still open (HPD) 
 
Source: * 
Serious maintenance risk 
Milking risk 
Extremely poorly regulated 
 
• Milking cues: 
o Landlord-initiated illegal conversions 
• Structural cues: 
o Extensive evidence of non-maintenance 
o Evidence of decline since (previous) sale 
o Failing bricks/mortar 
o Leaks in multiple apartment lines 
o Multiple instances of exposed/faulty wiring 
o “Repaired” structural violations re-cited again 
later 
• Regulatory cues: 
o HPD violations uncured 
o DOB inspectors missed major structural issues 
o DOB violations uncured 
 
18 1702 550 E 187TH ST 6/5/96 East Tremont; HPD shows no visits since 1996; back then, exposed 
electricals throughout cellar, and 3 lead paint violations in an apartment. 
(PS) 
 
DOB shows complaint that new LL stopped roof repairs in the middle 
(1997) and that the parapet was “spalling and bulging”. Violated again 
1998. 1996 complaint about illegal conversion. No other DOB action 
except violating the boiler a few times between 1991 and 2003. 1992 
landlord made application for permit to remove and repair roof 
overhanger; permit request was disapproved. 
 
No violations since 1996; is this building vacant? (HPD) 
 
Source: ** 
Maintenance risk 
Unregulated 
 
• Milking cues: 
o Landlord-initiated illegal conversions (old) 
• Structural cues: 
o Documented need for repairs (old); no 
evidence of repairs 
• Regulatory cues: 
o No HPD contact since 1996 
o No DOB contact since 2003 
 
 
TALLY: 
 
28%  Equity-drain or milking 
Bldg. 3,5,8,10,17 
44%  Façade/foundation 
Bldg. 3,5,6,7,8,10,13,17 
28%  No regulation 
Bldg. 1,2,11,15,18 
22%  Decline since sale 
Bldg. 3,8,10,17 
67%  Extensive non-maintenance 
Bldg. 1,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,12,13,16,17 
44%  Pervasive leaks/mold 
Bldg. 1,3,5,6,7,8,16,17 
 
Leaks/mold 
and  cracks: 
75% 44%  No compliance 
Bldg. 3,5,8,10,13,16,17,18 
39%  Immediate maint. risk 
Bldg. 1,3,5,7,15,16,18 
17%  Major rehab 
Bldg. 2,9,13 
100%  Most tenants don’t report 
Bldg. 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,15,16,17,18 
100%  Incomplete information 
Bldg. 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,15,16,17,18 
28%  Serious immediate risk 
Bldg. 6,8,10,13,17 
 
Total 
immediate: 
67% 
Anatomy o f  a co l lapse  
In March 2007, the façade of a standard Bronx pre-war multifamily building fell off and the 
courtyard collapsed. The collapse gives a sobering perspective: the building looks almost exactly the 
same, on paper, as the sample buildings. The records show almost exactly the same set of violations 
as the other buildings in the sample: cracking plaster, lack of painting, inadequate supply of gas to 
stoves. Similarly, only a few apartments (4 out of 51) had been inspected by HPD since 2002. The 
pattern of DOB violations and inspections also mirrors the sample buildings: a DOB inspection 
following the collapse found that the basement had been converted into five SROs. But an 
inspection fewer than three months earlier, based on a complaint about illegal conversions, had 
found the same result as many of the credible complaints called in by tenants of the sample 
buildings: the inspection report states that no rooms for living were found, and that “no action 
necessary [was] based on observation.” 
Much earlier, in 1999, the then-new landlord had been issued a stop-work order for doing 
illegal work on the parapets. According to DOB records, he secured the necessary permit. But DOB 
has no record of whether he completed the work. And about a month later, DOB issued a violation 
for the condition of the parapets: 
“Failure to maintain the condition of the front exterior building wall (South side): diagonal 
cracks above some of the windows, throughout the façade, including all of the top floor 
window. Parapet wall bric [cut off.]”192 
 
By the time the façade actually fell, the building was no longer on the radar of the regulatory 
agencies, and the trouble was unanticipated. At the scene, fire department and DOB officials 
grasped for reasons: 
“‘Our feeling is that it was age. Again [the department of] buildings is doing an evaluation,” 
                                                
192 NYC Buildings Information Database 
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said FDNY Deputy Chief Thomas Dunn. “It's conceivable that the support beams were 
compromised by age and rust.’ …The Department of Buildings said that water damage 
caused the collapse and the collapse, in turn, caused a gas line to break… Inspectors say the 
building appears stable.”193 
 
In its report later, DOB cites a courtyard collapse, not a façade collapse, caused by: “Failure to 
maintain: structural steel support I-beam and rebar corroded and rotted causing concrete courtyard 
floor collapse.” There is no record of the façade collapse, and no reference to the earlier violation. 
Clearly, piecemeal regulation is still not sufficient to the task of documenting the state of the 
building even after a crisis heightens regulatory attention. It’s not the fault of the inspectors; it’s just 
apparent that no system is in place. 
 
Hope for regu latory  change  
 Incremental improvements to regulation do promise some relief, although they do not solve 
some of regulators’ biggest problems. In April 2007, a coalition of housing advocates and City 
Council members announced the introduction of the NYC Safe Housing Act to reshape code 
enforcement in troubled buildings.194 The draft legislation hits at two core issues: that habitability 
violations in apartments have not yet been tackled as indicators of underlying conditions, “for 
example, water damage on a ceiling might be caused by a problem with the building’s central piping 
system”; and that repeated, roof-to-cellar contact with a building is needed to understand how the 
building is doing.195 Under the new code, HPD would be charged with remediating up to 200 of the 
city’s worst buildings each year, looking at the buildings as whole systems, stepping in to make 
                                                
193 “Terrace Collapse Blocks Main Entrance Of Bronx Building” NY1 News (TV), March 13, 2007 
194 Jonas, Jillian “An ‘Act’ that means action: housing bill requires repairs” CityLimits.org, April 16, 2007 
195 “Intro. No. 561.” New York City Council, May 3, 2007 
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repairs if landlords don’t comply, and revisiting the building every four months. The proposal 
represents an important acknowledgement of the need for better information-gathering, follow-up 
and enforcement mechanisms. It also represents a recognition that B violations, while not deemed 
“immediately hazardous” to tenants, can be indicators of deep building-wide trouble. 
 But the bill, which uses regulatory data systems to identify buildings in trouble, suffers from 
much of the same blindness as the regulatory system. First, it targets buildings with 5 or more 
“hazardous and immediately hazardous violations” per unit. (“Hazardous” and “immediately 
hazardous” are revised violation categories that would be established by another pending bill.196 
They correspond exactly to current definitions of B and C violations.197) But these violations are 
documented almost exclusively through tenant reporting. As the sample showed, some of the 
buildings that may be in the most imminent danger get no tenant reporting at all. 2525 Aqueduct 
Avenue, having no HPD inspections between 2004 and 2007, would not have been eligible for the 
program. Neither would any of the buildings that suggested “serious maintenance risk” in the 1% 
sample. Ada’s building, 443 Cyrus Place, would be eligible – but that is largely because a crisis had 
already occurred, which propelled the tenants to organize and call in HPD to document their 
troubles. The bill also misses buildings owned by Bronx investors who may be fiscally responsible, 
but whose investment plan includes deferred maintenance or strategic decay. It specifies that, for the 
first four years, only buildings with a per-unit lien of $100 or more are eligible for enforcement – but 
as shown below, a low per-unit lien is not an indicator of good stewardship. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
196 “Intro. No. 56o.” New York City Council, May 22, 2007 
197 NYC Dept. of Housing Preservation & Development: Online Glossary (undated) 
 95 
None of the sample’s high-risk buildings 
is eligible for advanced enforcement 
Disqualifying factors are in bold type. 
Risk Address Viols./unit 
Enough HPD reports 
within 2 years? 
Lien/unit Eligible? 
Milking 2123 Tiebout Ave. 2.6 No $20.20 No 
Milking 2810 Olinville Ave. 0.27 No $0 No 
Milking & Serious Maint. 2208 Walton Ave. 16.38 No $1,239.71 No 
Milking & Serious Maint. 480 Concord Ave. 7.35 No $8.51 No 
Serious Maintenance 2420 Bronx Park E. 0.38 No $1,151.83 No 
Serious Maintenance 2505 Olinville Ave. 1.22 No $48.27 No 
Violations/unit include A,B & C offenses. The count of just B & C violations (used to assess eligibility) would be somewhat lower. 
 
 
 
A separate proposed bill helps fill in the tenant reporting gap by mandating that every building in 
the city be inspected from top to bottom by an engineer or architect on a five-year cycle, and that a 
report be filed certifying the building’s condition.198 And the Safe Housing Act and the other 
proposed bills recognize the remaining difficulty of simply gaining access to the parts of a building 
that need inspection. Together, they establish a process – necessarily labor intensive, time 
consuming and cross-agency – by which DOB and HPD can sue for access if needed. But the 
upshot is that inspection and enforcement suffer enormously from their limitations. 
 
Assess ing the  curren t  prospec ts  for Bronx hous ing s tock  
 Regulatory faults aside, the similarities between the sample and the collapsed building 
indicate either that most Bronx buildings are in some danger of collapsing, or that the available 
information is too scattered and poor to make any assessment. Since lenders’ data is compromised 
too, the buildings’ chances are still very much unknown. But it is clear that some buildings will not 
survive their current trajectory. 
 
 
                                                
198 “Intro. No. 550.” New York City Council, March 20, 2007 
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Part 2: Will the tenants go away? 
 Testing tenants’ likely actions is much more difficult than looking at the building sample. But 
assembling a list of contributing factors, and comparing them to past tenant behaviors, gives an 
indication of possible outcomes. 
 
Can the  Bronx do gentri f i cation-as -usual? 
The Bronx’s gentrification trajectory does not quite mirror any other New York City 
neighborhood’s experience. Gentrification has generally been created when lower-income tenants 
moved out, rent jumped to the point where a new low-income tenant could not move in, and 
higher-income tenants who had been priced out of other apartments became willing to accept the 
formerly low-income apartment. This process has been accelerated by renovation increases, the 
arrival of amenities in neighborhoods that increase the attraction for higher-income renters, etc. 
New Yorkers are in disagreement about whether developers can cultivate that “attractiveness” in 
extremely dense Bronx pre-war enclaves. But holding “attractiveness” constant, gentrification has 
primarily been fueled by the departure of low-income tenants. 
 The recent gentrification of Harlem, for example, has pushed out many low-income and 
very-low income tenants – in many cases by applying regular legal rent increases to apartments that 
had previously been much cheaper because the neighborhood was considered undesirable. In other 
words, no effort at all was required by landlords; housing pressures elsewhere in Manhattan simply 
meant the apartments were worth more, and recent changes to rent regulation meant they could 
raise prices almost immediately.199 Anecdotally, those tenants are now moving to the only place left 
                                                
199 Before 2003, landlords who charged a “preferential rent” below legal rent could not revert to the legal rent 
until the apartment was vacated. Under new regulations, the rent can revert to legal rent at lease renewal. As a 
result, rent amounts can jump by hundreds of dollars at a time. / Division of Housing & Community 
Renewal, “Preferential Rents And Rent Concessions For Rent Stabilized Apartments In New York City And 
"ETPA Localities" In Westchester, Nassau And Rockland Counties; Rent Law of 2003” 
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for them in New York City: the Bronx.200 
 Housing analysts and community-watchers report that some low-income tenants are moving 
out of the Bronx, too. Father John Flynn, long-time pastor of a large parish in a central Bronx 
neighborhood consisting almost entirely of pre-war buildings, reports an exodus of renters to New 
Rochelle and Yonkers. According to Father Flynn, the tenants have essentially been forced out by 
rising prices, which rise far above inflation levels each year while wages fall, even within rent 
regulation.201 Even when tenants are forced out, though, the decision to leave still involves a series 
of trade-offs. To leave the Bronx, they have given up access to jobs and social networks, as well as 
opportunities for city-specific subsidies. In other words, faced with rising rents, they have decided 
that New Rochelle or Yonkers is less unaffordable than the Bronx. 
 But future squeezed renters will face a different set of opportunities and trade-offs. New 
Rochelle and Yonkers, like the rest of Westchester’s increasingly dense cities, are in the throes of 
major affordable housing crises themselves. Even if price-squeezed Bronx tenants want to move 
there, they cannot be accommodated en masse. In any case, the tenants moving to the Bronx to fill 
the leavers’ apartments are not yet the gentrifiying set, but anecdotally are often low-income families 
displaced from Harlem and other changeover neighborhoods.202 As such they are more likely to be 
tied by social and employment networks to New York City; for them, a move to Westchester might 
be more unaffordable than staying in their Bronx apartments. Those renters are likely to double up, 
push their rent payments to even greater proportions of their income, and otherwise fight to stay. 
 For Ada, the only alternative to staying in her apartment is a much more dramatic move: 
emigration. While Ada’s options are broadened by the fact that she is past retirement age, she does 
not envision gentrification or suburban migration as the endpoint of the landlord-tenant price 
                                                
200 Interview: Jim Buckley 4/9/07 
201 Interview: Father John Flynn 3/2/07 
202 Interview: Jim Buckley 
 98 
conflict. 
“When there’s only Section 8 left – and it’s only for some people who qualify – a lot of 
people are going to have to back to their counties… Because the minimum wage isn’t going 
up. How is a poor person going to pay rent for $2000 or $2500?... We make the country 
work. Rich people can’t live without poor people. [But] we’re going to lose like half of New 
York. You can have your buildings, but they’ll be empty.”203 
 
Ada’s mass exodus is not the kind of vacancy that Bronx investors are dreaming about. Even 
if the immigrant population of the Bronx were all able to leave the country – if Bronx conditions 
were allowed to get so bad that reverse emigration became less unaffordable than staying in the U.S. 
– the process would be preceded by a deepening poverty and desperation that does not precipitate 
gentrification. (That process is sketched out in the following section.) 
Meanwhile, it seems the opposite process is taking place in buildings where landlords are just 
waiting for the upside. While the poorest tenants cling to their apartments, those with more 
resources are looking elsewhere. Gus’ better-resourced neighbors moved soon after the fire.  
“The ones that left were the ones who always wanted to leave because of the drug problem. 
It was the people who could afford to pay one month rent and one month deposit – they 
moved. The other people are day-to-day survivors, they can’t afford [to move.]”204 
 
Gus himself stayed long enough to organize his building. But he has a good-paying job and choices 
about where to live. In the end, he moved too. 
 
Packing in  even more  o f  the  poores t t enants  
 Demographic factors also point to Bronx tenants’ capacity to hang on to apartments, even if 
they sacrifice the quality of their housing in the process. First, the Bronx has the lowest vacancy rate 
                                                
203 Interview: Ada 3/23/07 
204 Interview: Gus Birru 3/15/07 
 99 
in the city: 2.6% borough-wide in 2005. Rather than climbing as prices have increased over the last 
several years, the vacancy rate has dropped.205 While a portion of that decline may be attributable to 
the arrival of new tenants in the Bronx, it’s extremely unlikely that new tenants are the whole 
story.206 The combined price of moving207 and re-renting a vacated apartment also make it highly 
likely that the decreased vacancy rate reflects tenants’ hunkering down against price increases. 
 Clinging to apartments indicates that, while tenants are under strain, they have not reached 
their breaking point. (And in this case it’s not clear what that point would be, given the dearth of any 
other options.) Bronx renters, including both subsidized and unsubsidized, have seen their rent 
burden increase to almost 35% of income, a tighter squeeze than any other borough.208 And renters’ 
actual incomes have declined enormously – citywide, they decreased by 8.6% between 2004 and 
2005.209 The Bronx likely saw an even greater decline. But 22% of Bronx units are subsidized, the 
highest proportion in all the boros. Subsidized tenants are not only less likely to be priced out of 
their current apartments, but they are also much less likely to be able to seek housing outside the city 
(Section 8, HASA and DHS vouchers are administered by city agencies, and are not portable across 
city lines.) They have both resources and extra incentive to stay in the Bronx. 
Also, neither self-paying nor subsidized tenants have maxed out the use of their space: as a 
group, they have more room to double up when the need arises. Bronx pre-war apartments, by 
virtue of their undesirability, have much less history of being subdivided than those in other boros. 
Currently 5.7% of low-income unsubsidized Bronx renters are listed as “severely crowded,” while 
                                                
205 Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006 
206 Census data, crunched in Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006, only counts an increase of 5,671 people in 
the Bronx between 2002 and 2005; the Bronx’s population rank among NYC boros remained the same over 
that period (4th out of 5) 
207 In addition to logistical costs and opportunity costs, the costs of changing apartments generally include 
security deposit, first-and-last month’s rent and broker’s fee. 
208 Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006 
209 NYC Housing & Vacancy Survey, Initial Findings. NYC Dept. of Housing Preservation & Development, 2005 
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across all Bronx renter households (which includes subsidized ones) 4.5% are listed as such.210 In 
terms of social welfare and housing justice, those numbers are high. But it terms of capacity to 
reduce rent and increase income by squishing even further, they suggest that space remains. 
 
Wishfu l thinking and investor pi t fal l s  
 The uniqueness of the Bronx’s situation and the seeming illogic of landlords’ hopes for 
gentrification beg the question: do landlords and lenders, who live elsewhere and gather data from a 
fairly motley set of sources, really understand what’s happening in their buildings? Willia McKeiver, 
who has talked to her own landlords and their lenders extensively, made this observation: 
“Landlords think everybody makes $40,000 or $60,000 and that’s just not true. A lot of us 
still make twenty, twenty-five if you’re lucky. You have to put a hold on it, can’t keep letting 
rents go so high that you have three families in one apt. I feel like they’re trying to make 
New York City a jail – have you seen that movie with Kirk Douglas, “Escape from New 
York?” That’s my rendition.”211 
 
Willia is at least partly right: median household income in Bronx neighborhoods212 ranged 
from $15,444 to $30,432 (with the somewhat surprising exception of outlier Morris Park/Bronxdale, 
where median income was $34,400.)213 When the landlords I interviewed, (including Willia’s) did not 
make any such claims, though, I became convinced that she was wrong about the rest. Surely 
number-crunching investors have a grasp on the relationship between rents and tenants’ ability to 
pay? But the lender who holds the mortgage on Willia’s building – and whose thinking gives insight 
into the logic of Bronx multifamily investment – came through for Willia’s point. 
                                                
210 Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006 
211 Willia 
212 Except these neighborhoods: Riverdale, which is quasi-suburban; Throgg’s Neck/Co-op City, which has a 
much higher proportion of homeowners than other Bronx neighborhoods; and Williamsbridge/Baychester, 
where median income is elevated to $31,400 by neighborhood boundaries that include both very poor and 
much wealthier residents. (Source: US Census Data) 
213 Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006. Median incomes are for 2005, measured in 2004 dollars. 
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“In the Bronx… in blue collar neighborhoods, rents are primarily rent-stabilized and rent 
levels are reasonably comfortable for people to handle, maybe $600 for a 2-bedroom. 
They’re manageable, especially for working families; you’d usually have a few people 
working. We’re not talking huge numbers.”214 
 
Despite the lender’s success as an investor, he’s wrong.215  Median rent was $775 in 2005 for all 
Bronx apartments.216 The median household incomes listed above include working families with 
multiple jobs, and they are indisputably low. Rent levels, climbing past 50% of income, are not at all 
comfortable. 
 In the lender’s few sentences, the essence of Willia’s point rings true: investors gambling on 
tenants may be making fatal miscalculations. Their error, in addition to meaning that tenants may 
not vacate apartments according to plan, poses threats to other elements of gentrification. If tenants 
double up in huge numbers, will crime rise, will new businesses anchor there, will community 
resources be stretched to the point of crisis and neighborhood decline? Will the added cost of too 
many tenants – water bills, wear and tear, more demands on management time – shift investors’ 
profit structure off their foundations? Will the buildings’ structures fail under the stress even as 
prices are rising? Predicting Bronx tenants’ path may be difficult, but their available options are 
clearly different than in earlier instances of gentrification. Given the limiting conditions, and the 
spatial capacity for tenants to do more of the old solution – doubling up – investors’ belief in 
“nothing but upside” rests on shaky foundations. 
                                                
214 Jim Carpenter 4/19/07 
215 A lender’s idea that the median apartment costs about $600 might reasonably be drawn from the NYS 
Dept. of Finance data on Real Property Income & Expense (RPIE.) But according to the NYC Rent 
Guidelines Board, RPIE data measures collected rent, and lowers its numbers to account for uncollected 
rents and vacancies. So, while the median owner might collect $600 per apartment, the median tenant is 
paying more. The error is an good example of the distance between housing economics on paper and the 
real-world dynamics of prices and payers. (NYC Rental Income & Expense Study. NYC Rent Guidelines 
Board, 2007) 
216 Furman Center for Real Estate, 2006 
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Part 3: What happens if buildings lose their investment value? 
 Market predictions are beyond the scope of this research. But given the high rent multiples 
for which Bronx buildings are selling, and the chorus of long-term market observers who believe 
that these prices are not supportable in the long run, a downturn is credible. 
 UNHP has begun planning for assistance to holders of multifamily buildings that find 
themselves simultaneously in physical distress and financial trouble. Their proposal for a Multifamily 
Assistance Center includes provisions for bringing in HPD code enforcement; and lenders in their 
dual capacity as a source of support for improvement, and as a regulator who could ultimately seize 
a building and transfer it to a new owner, potentially a non-profit group.217 UNHP’s proposal is 
intended to minimize the delays in remediating buildings that can be caused by long foreclosure 
proceedings – not to take buildings from owners.218 But some “paper” owners who never intended 
to operate their buildings, much less engage with low-income tenants in the Bronx, may well prefer 
to walk away. 
This raises an interesting prospect: abandonment by investors without abandonment of 
buildings. If investors abandon buildings not for the reasons of the past – that the buildings have no 
value to anyone – but because the buildings simply have no positive value to them, then the 
possibility exists to return the buildings to a rational valuation.  On the other hand, if landlords hang 
onto their buildings as they fill with more tenants – if they perform sufficient repairs to let the 
buildings survive, and find ways to keep up with the added pressures on building systems of 
dramatically increased use – there will still have to be a reckoning when landlords revise their view 
of the neighborhoods. They will have to accept their place as landlords of the present low-income 
Bronx population, rather than holders of chits to be cashed in a more glamorous future.  
                                                
217 University Neighborhood Housing Program Multifamily Assistance Center Proposal. UNHP, undated. 
218 Ibid. 
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In the struggle between gentrification and abandonment, either of these outcomes may 
constitute a third way. 
 
Taking s tock  
 Landlords and lenders are counting on tenants to leave; not in the sense of Ada’s 
catastrophic scenario, but by orderly, naturally occurring vacancies. In their version of events, the 
upside comes from vacancy rent increases that occur gradually enough to be supported by higher-
income tenants moving outward from Manhattan, into a Bronx with steadily increasing amenities 
and a growing middle class character. Some of that will undoubtedly occur, through both the life 
cycles of city dwellers and through crises in the lives of low-income tenants. City programs will also 
spur some price-increasing instability unless they’re revamped: just like the DHS Scattered Site 
program, Housing Stability Plus (Scattered Site’s programmatic heir) fosters expensive churning at 
the bottom of the market.219 
But because tenants have nowhere else to go – because prices have reached the point where 
New York’s rent regulations no longer preserve affordability, and because housing and population 
pressures enormously outpace housing availability – the presumption that they’ll behave as priced-
out tenants have in the past is not particularly well-founded. Similarly, the presumption that naturally 
occurring vacancies will appear within the time frame of other gentrifying neighborhoods seems 
misplaced. 
Instead, the clash of investors’ expectations and Bronx realities will mean that many 
properties will bear debt burdens that are not supported by increased operating income for longer 
than their owners anticipated. Some earlier investors, like 1920 Walton Avenue’s Manny Stein, may 
undertake timely gut repairs, but it seems unlikely that “craze” buildings sold at the inflated prices of 
                                                
219 “On First Anniversary of Mayor’s Homeless Housing Assistance Program, Advocates and Housing 
Groups Call for Reforms” Coalition for the Homeless, New York City, January 24, 2006 
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the last few years will improve. In some cases, continued non-maintenance and/or milking will lead 
to the actual loss of buildings; community groups also predict a possible spate of foreclosures on 
over-leveraged buildings.220 Meanwhile, the buildings will unavoidably become more heavily 
burdened with tenants, and even more critically important as a source of low-income housing. 
 In spite of the crisis-bound direction of the game of deferring maintenance costs, edging up 
prices and stuffing poor tenants into apartments, regulators are deeply disempowered in this picture. 
Recent developments may accord more physical power to New York’s housing agencies, but they 
are still hobbled by their massive lack of information. Socially-besieged tenants are still required to 
act as impotent housing inspectors, banks act as disparate compilers of some information about 
some buildings’ quality, and landlords both implement and sign off on their own repair work. 
Regulation by markets is equally ineffective, subjecting landlords to purchase and operating costs 
that are unsupported by available rents.  
 These factors may be resolved – not easily, but possibly – if communities can prepare for 
investors’ reactions to falling prices. But what about making change before then? 
 
 
                                                
220 Buckley, J. and O’Leary, C., 2003 
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CHAPTER 7 
CHANGING DIRECTIONS 
 
Urban planners and housing strategists have regularly pointed out that market forces cannot 
be counted on to provide adequate housing, maintain affordability, preserve existing structures, 
balance a city’s economic need to house low-income workers, or supply the shelter to which they 
have a right.221 Gentrification that presses on tenants without regard for whether they have 
somewhere else to go (or why they should have to move so that wealthier people can settle in their 
neighborhoods), and abandonment that takes affordable housing out of the pool without regard for 
the need for it, are stark examples of this failure. 
The landlords and tenants interviewed here largely agree that it’s not working. The landlords 
who sympathize with their low-income tenants (while also managing their buildings’ tight budgets) 
call directly for government intervention in building conditions and price structures, as detailed 
below. Tenants, for their part, call for interventions that hold landlords and lenders directly 
accountable for conditions in their buildings; an acknowledgement of tenants’ extreme lack of access 
to substitutions. These two areas of change – physical and economic intervention, and improved 
enforcement – are aimed at a larger goal: creating a capacity for communities, by whatever 
definition, to determine what housing is available, to whom, and of what quality. 
 
Supporting building operations, as regulation 
 Manipulations of where housing cost burdens land have become an important social justice 
issue, touching on race and class inequality as well as property rights and capitalism in general. On 
one hand, landlord Manny Stein laments that “subsidizing people who can’t pay somehow fell to the 
                                                
221 Marcuse, P. “The Liberal/Conservative Divide in the History of Housing Policy in the United States.” 
Housing Studies, Vol. 16, No. 6, 2001 
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landlords instead of public coffers.”222 For him, increasing rents is a solution to his cost problem. 
On the other hand, the increased cost of rent doesn’t necessarily get passed on to people for whom 
it’s a fair burden – but for lack of choice, they often pay it anyway. Willia recounts: 
“My mother got put out of 116th Street and 8th Avenue. The rent was $600, and when she 
left after 5 years her rent was $1100. [They thought they’d get rid of her by raising the rent 
but] she kept finding the money. Finally they wrote her a letter and put her out.”223 
 
Whether for survival or for less noble purposes, many landlords have sought to “negotiate 
costs” by manipulating income (rents) and expense (maintenance etc.), or by driving out low-paying 
tenants. Willia’s first landlord made repairs to DHS-contracted apartments where they would 
increase his return; he used non-maintenance in private apartments to decrease his costs, at least in 
the short run. Ada’s landlord apparently used non-maintenance to harass tenants out, and then the 
vacate order, issued after fire, to keep them out; hoping to make rent-billable improvements, get 
wealthier tenants or even use the turnover to charge new tenants illegal increases. Tenants have also 
sought to manipulate prices within the limited means available to them: doubling up, accumulating 
arrears, etc. In all cases, the manipulations are damaging to at least one party, and frequently to the 
building as well. 
 Advocates on both sides have often tried to address cost burden through legal strategies and 
political moves to shift the cost burden between landlords and tenants. The Pataki administration, 
supported by a major landlord lobby group, famously legislated vacancy decontrol while telling 
tenants that their rents would be lower on the open market.224 (Tenant advocates have been seeking 
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223 Interview: Willia McKeiver 3/23/07 
224 Pérez-Peña, Richard “Landlords Take Their Case, And Pataki's, to the Radio” New York Times, May 28, 
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its repeal ever since – a move they regard as protecting tenants’ access to affordable housing, and 
which landlords regard as an attempt to shift cost burden back onto them.) 
But shifting costs between landlords and tenants is inadequate. The majority of Bronx 
tenants in question clearly cannot afford rent hikes – most of the landlords interviewed 
acknowledged that fact – and in many cases the landlords do not appear to be getting enormously 
rich either. For Bronx owners in particular, operating income appears to have decreased in recent 
years.225 Taking the lowest-income tenants and the least-rich landlords as a starting point for 
effective change, fixing the housing situation requires some intervention besides shifting the cost 
burden between the two. 
The players’ own proposals center around decreasing operating costs, supporting the 
creation of additional/rehabbed units and increasing subsidies and support to both landlords and 
tenants. Echoing the distress of 1970s landlords at energy crisis-driven increases in operating costs 
for low-rent housing, landlord Frank Anelante says: 
“Even with low rent, we find people still can’t pay. But it’s a mistake for politicians to say 
‘let’s hold rent income down’ when there’s no control of operating expenses… In many 
areas, market rent is below what the building needs in order to operate. Government has to 
really talk about allocation of resources as part of this issue… Some of the burden for 
providing affordable housing – you can only do it with subsidies.”226 
 
Some movement exists already to reduce government-imposed costs or use government 
funds to add value to existing housing. UNHP points to climbing water rates and income tax 
assessments (increasing with the market value of buildings, independent of actual rents) as costs 
within the city’s control. The group also maintains a Green Loan fund to support energy-efficiency 
renovations that reduce operating costs. Housing First!, a coalition of community advocates, unions, 
                                                
225 NYC Rent Guidelines Board, 2007 
226 Interview: Frank Anelante 4/16/07 
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housing developers, lenders and other groups, outlines a specific platform for finding state funding 
to support rehabs of existing units and extensions of existing tenant subsidies that pay increases in 
regulated rents, or even market-level rents.227 Anelante proposes extending Section 8 vouchers to 
tenants making 120% of AMI (from the current 60%), because “we find that those people are also 
having a hard time paying.” He also proposes that government should simply subsidize the 
operations of privately-owned affordable housing, not just non-profit housing; and also subsidize 
rehabs.228 
Notably, these are not proposals for the removal of housing to the non-profit realm. Instead, 
they are a statement that, if communities want private landlords to operate buildings and rehabilitate 
their declining existing units, the cost of operating those buildings well should be supported by the 
state as a component of regulating building quality. Such intervention might be targeted to increase 
the value of housing in relation to its costs, alleviate excessive demand that raises prices far beyond 
people’s ability to pay, and intensively insulate affordable housing from a market that clearly does 
not support it . 
The obvious caveat is that funding landlords as a component of building quality is untenable 
without modes of real regulation – and that landlords cannot be entrusted as stewards until the issue 
of massive commodification and “paper ownership” is resolved. 
 
De-papering housing ownership 
The paper ownership problem is illuminated by a massive proliferation of tax shelter blogs, 
investment magazines and real estate discussions expressing a fairly shocking enthusiasm for no-
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management property investment and free money.229 While most seem to be advertised as 
opportunities to invest in property that’s managed by someone else – no website I found specifically 
suggests that people invest their nest egg in dangerously decaying low-income buildings in the 
Bronx, for example – the compunction-free use of other people’s housing as a money-making pawn 
begs for redress. Whether through investor education campaigns, exposés of proxy management 
firms or other means, the pervasive illusion that equity can continually be drained from real estate, 
without regard for human or civic consequences, must be broken. 
Tenant groups have also been using existing rules to battle equity-draining by paper 
investors. As early as 1988, NWBCCC was taking lenders to task using the “good repair” clause 
standard in mortgages – starting with Freddie Mac, which was under-regulating and over-financing 
Bronx multifamily borrowers.230 All three case study buildings are beneficiaries of that tactic; each 
won repairs and building management reform by getting lenders to apply pressure on their landlord 
borrowers. In the case of 1920 Walton, tenants used the lender’s relationship with a large-scale 
investor to get him actually to divest himself from their building.  
But the paper owner problem also requires intervention in the rules themselves – an 
amendment of code at the federal level; or at the local level, a circumscription of the exercise of 
Section 1031 within New York City. Although legislative change is a big task, housing advocates 
have already set their sights on it. UNHP proposes digging into banking regulations, adding 
conditions of buildings in a bank’s portfolio as a factor in their CRA rating.231 Picture the Homeless 
                                                
229 A Google search for Section 1031 investment advice websites turns up a variety of approaches, from 
simple tax advice to exhortations to get on board. One representative article, with subheadings including “I 
don’t know how this made it past the IRS watchdogs!” is: (no author) “1031 Tax-free Exchange: Once 
Complicated, Now Easy” InternationalLiving.com, Dec. 2, 2003 
(http://www.internationalliving.com/real_estate_articles/free/eletters_443.cfm on 5/24/07) 
230 Groarke, M. “Organizing Against Overfinancing:  The Northwest Bronx Coalition Campaign Against 
Freddie Mac” Bronx County Historical Society Journal, Fall 2002 
231 Shrinking Affordability: Housing Prices, Quality & Preservation in the City’s Last Expanse of Affordable Housing. 
United Neighborhood Housing Program, 2007. 
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– noting that Manhattan’s warehoused, unrepaired apartments could house all of New York’s 
homeless population – proposes that owners be prohibited from not rehabbing and renting out 
offline units.232 
The extent to which these proposals seem radical is the extent to which housing has been 
removed from civic control, and to which private interests in “the free market” diverge from the 
public interest. Again, none proposes reserving property for non-profit management – just 
parameters on how private interests may leverage a critical public resource. 
 
Maintaining real knowledge about buildings 
The dearth of information available to HPD and DOB is crippling to any other efforts to 
reshape the relationship between buildings, owners and communities. But the extreme barriers to 
information-gathering experienced by HPD and DOB are smaller barriers to lenders, who have 
much greater access to landlords; and to community groups, who have much greater access to 
tenants. Some organizations have already built systems to foster information-sharing, including 
efforts to use lenders’ access to round out shared information. NWBCCC has fostered a relationship 
with HPD by which it can leverage some HPD action against problem landlords,233 and its 
campaigns to hold lenders accountable have produced lender inspections and documenting. 
UNHP’s Building Indicator Project pulls publicly available data on building finances – mortgage 
amounts and liens – and splices it together with physical data. That much could be done by any 
public agency with the time, resources and ingenuity in order to bolster regulators’ knowledge about 
housing stock. But UNHP also markets the tool (for free) to lenders to help them understand the 
nexus of physical issues and market issues; and convenes lenders, owners, tenants and regulators in 
face-to-face conversations on what’s actually happening on the ground. 
                                                
232 Homeless people count vacant properties in Manhattan. Picture the Homeless, 2007 
233 Reynoso, 2006 
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UNHP (like NWBCCC, the Urban Justice Center, Mothers on the Move and Picture the 
Homeless, whose reports are cited here) also publishes its research findings to counter the under-
documentation of factors affecting Bronx housing. Tellingly, the community-generated reports all 
base their analyses on a combination of hard data and interviews that provide anecdotes and 
interpretation – an investigative format that’s de rigeur in the business world, but almost entirely 
missing from city agencies’ documentation processes. The community reports highlight the 
inadequacy of number-crunching as a method of understanding a complex physical and fiscal 
market. Unfortunately, while information-sharing is a basic, intuitive approach to stewardship of a 
critical public resource, it is not built into city rules or agency practice. It should be. 
 
Engaging tenants, but not counting on them 
 Ideas and impetus for change, so far, have come through community organizations. Tenants’ 
organizing in particular has been absolutely critical in improving individual building conditions and 
framing Bronx-wide problems, as has their collective insistence that 1) both enforcement and laws 
are not good enough, and 2) landlords have responsibilities for their tenants’ human rights as well as 
for their property. Often, because of the physical immediacy of housing crises, movement has come 
one building at a time. But the three case study buildings forced action from WaMu, Dime and 
Citibank as lenders on problem buildings, and their campaigns add to the groundswell that seems 
poised to force lenders across the board to be better regulators of their investments. Community 
groups’ particular strength is their extra-regulatory capacity to collect real, useful information at the 
street level, and to compile it into a comprehensive analysis of what’s happening to buildings and 
neighborhoods. 
But in the Bronx alone, there are at least 4,663 5- and 6-storey, pre-war, rent-regulated 
buildings housing vulnerable and alienated tenants. Community groups cannot be expected to 
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organize them all even to report on their buildings, much less to pursue arduous code enforcement. 
Tenants possess important, specific information about their buildings, and can’t be replaced as 
elements of a regulation system. But they can’t be asked to be responsible for driving it, either. 
Instead, more realistic building-wide monitoring of systemic problems, as in the City Council’s 
proposed 5-year roof-to-cellar inspections, should provide the framework for understanding 
building conditions. If they’re bad, regulators should reach out to tenants, rather than the reverse. A 
regulatory system that invites tenants to share their knowledge with an active system advocating on 
their behalf is far more likely to win their help. 
 
Dealing with density 
 The issue of doubling-up is not limited to neighborhoods pressed by gentrification. 
Although it has room to go further, the Bronx is already likely the most doubled-up borough in the 
city.234 And the lack of alternative housing isn’t simply price-based either – housing is filling up. New 
York City is gaining units but still under exteme stress;235 although part of the problem is that many 
of the units it gained are not affordable to most New Yorkers, another part is that the population 
grew too. The New York Citizens Housing & Planning Council, a citywide research group, estimates 
that up to half of the units gained in the last 15 years have come from illegal conversions, many of 
which simply overcrowded rooms. Some neighborhoods (in Queens, rather than the Bronx) are 
finding that conversions are swelling their populations to levels that are stressing their city 
services.236 
Increased density and apartment overcrowding will not fail to happen even if the Bronx finds a 
way other than its current path. As inner cities slipped into the abyss in the late 1960s, the Mayor of 
                                                
234 Smith et al., 2005 
235 NYC Housing & Vacancy Survey, Initial Findings, 2005 
236 “New York’s Underground Housing” The Urban Prospect, June/July 2003 
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Newark, surveying his own city, said: “Wherever America is going, Newark is going to get there 
first.”237 In this case, facing growing demand for New York as “luxury product” as well as for 
housing for the swelling low-income population, the Bronx may get there first. In that case, supports 
for operations and maintenance, and a regulatory system that engages and advocates for tenants, will 
be even more essential. 
 
 
Committing to Change 
Bronx housing is a precious resource that now lies mostly unguarded. Bolstering the 
community-led effort to plan for its continued existence requires simultaneous interventions in cost 
structure, physical housing quality and regulation. And it incorporates a set of players whom 
interventions must take specifically into account – investors who have already bought buildings at 
inflated prices, lenders who are deeply invested in neighborhoods and their “upsides,” tenants who 
might tolerate worse conditions than usual but should not be put in that position; regulators with 
little current capacity to regulate. 
What seems to be prescribed is a shift in regulators’ and lenders’ overarching approach to 
the Bronx. There will be more tenants, more overcrowding, more stress on buildings. Price increases 
are likely to occur without real gentrification, but also to come more slowly than investors have 
anticipated. Without a shift in oversight and support provided by regulators (including the de facto 
regulators of the financing world) these changes may ultimately destroy the buildings themselves. 
The policy recommendations and information-gathering practices of community groups who have 
already acknowledged this reality are an excellent foundation for building deeper prevention 
mechanisms – if regulators are far-sighted enough to adopt them.
                                                
237 Sternlieb & Burchell, 1973 
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APPENDIX 1 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This research began as an attempt to understand how low-income tenants and their 
landlords exert control over apartments in the Bronx, focusing on the 5- and 6-storey pre-war 
multifamily buildings that typify the Bronx’s low-income rent-regulated stock. The plan was to use 
case studies to trace how landlords and tenants interact in an environment of laws, code and 
procedure, and in the “gray areas”: informal encounters in apartment buildings that are both public 
and private; that are tenants’ homes, landlords’ property and New York City housing stock. Since 
low-income tenants, as a means of being able to stay in their housing long-term, also experience an 
especially urgent need to preserve the quality of that housing, look at control over apartments also 
meant looking at the physical condition of Bronx building stock as a whole, and investigating how 
relationships between landlords and specifically low-income tenants affect the stewardship of those 
buildings. 
But that investigation quickly revealed the vulnerability of these buildings to crisis, tenants’ 
extreme difficulty in getting landlords to maintain habitability, and the likelihood that relatively new 
investment strategies have changed landlords’ approach to tenants and maintenance. It became clear 
that the “real story” is about how buildings and tenants are viewed and operated on by the forces 
that control building quality; namely, landlords and regulatory agencies. While the ecology of 
landlord-tenant relationships is a central piece of that story, the intensive commodification of 
housing has meant that the arena of “landlords” becomes much more complex; now investors, who 
are a different kind of landlord altogether, must be added to the picture. For some, understanding 
their tenants as low-income people shapes their approach. Some are waiting for higher-income 
tenants. Some have no relationship with tenants at all, but think of buildings or portfolios. The 
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addition of these characters to the ecology of Bronx housing relationships require looking beyond 
landlord-tenant relationships to an ecology, or at least a logic, of investor/building relationships. It 
also requires a reevaluation of the relationship between the new set of investors and a regulatory 
system designed to act locally and on-the-ground, rather than in national and international financial 
markets. 
While the findings of this research are based on formal data and interviews, the process of 
investigation – knowing where to look next – was directed by local knowledge about Bronx as an 
environment for relationships. Some of that knowledge was gathered from informal chats with 
tenants, organizers, policy makers and other New Yorkers; some of it was drawn from my own 
experience as a tenant organizer and anti-racist activist in the Bronx and other parts of New York 
City. In this case, community-generated research and informal knowledge was critical to 
understanding the Bronx housing landscape, not least because many of the actors in housing 
investment act in semi-secrecy. 
Preliminary conversations with Bronx housing and anti-homelessness organizations 
provided an overview of current housing directions, and pointed to citywide gentrification pressures 
as a driving concern for low-income tenants. These conversations also emphasized community 
organizations’ ongoing frustration with the “toothlessness” of regulations governing housing quality, 
affordability and availability, and their focus on the loan industry as an important point of leverage 
for change. 
Case study buildings were identified with the help of Bronx housing organizers from 
Northwest Bronx Community & Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC), which seeks out troubled buildings 
and tenant leadership, and networks the buildings to leverage improvements and housing fairness; 
and Housing Here and Now (HHN), a policy advocacy coalition with strong ties to Bronx 
community organizing. 
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The buildings included in the focus are the ubiquitous 5- to 6-storey pre-war building. They 
are described in more detail in Chapter 3, which presents the history of this housing stock. 
The case studies were initially intended to paint a picture of tenants, landlords and physical 
condition of buildings. Landlords are often absent or elusive, but are critical to the picture; so as a 
criterion for finding buildings where information on landlords would be readily available, I looked 
for buildings that had experienced a crisis which brought landlords to the table with tenants. Three 
buildings were selected that included a mix of tenants (organized/not organized, 
unsubsidized/subsidized by an array of sources, differing in race/immigration/language status), a 
mix of landlord types and tenant leaders willing to participate in interviews. Tenant interviews 
provided information on building conditions, maintenance patterns, interactions with landlords and 
strategies that worked (or didn’t) for dealing with building quality. They also provided information 
about tenants’ relationships to various entities with power over the building, from city agencies to 
their landlords’ mortgage-holders. 
Later, the case studies were expanded to include examination of regulatory documentation of 
building quality, landlords’ claims of compliance, and how these indicators coincided in time with 
equity-leveraging activity involving the building. Since only one case study landlord responded to the 
request for an interview, an enormous amount of internet sleuthing (using sources and methods 
described below) substituted for information on the other landlords’ investment activities and 
management track records. 
The case study interviews were supplemented with “big picture” interviews of two more 
landlords, a lender and a community-based market watchdog/activist group. One landlord, whose 
interview is not directly cited in the paper, was Laura Jervis, Executive Director of the non-profit 
West Side Federation for Senior & Supportive Housing. That interview gave a baseline for 
understanding housing investment strategy driven by preservation and cost-minimizing goals, 
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informed by hands-on operations. (This provided a foil for investors operating from outside with 
less transparent goals.) The second landlord was a long-time owner/developer in the Bronx who 
added insight about the difference between long-term ownership strategies and current investment; 
and about operating, maintaining and rehabbing privately-held buildings. The lender interviewed 
explained the thinking behind his own bank’s investment in Bronx buildings, and was able to 
contribute information from the banking grapevine about other approaches. The community group, 
University Neighborhood Housing Program (UNHP), is a convener of landlords, lenders, regulators 
and housing activists; as such, they offered a more multi-faceted view of the Bronx housing market 
from the perspective of both investors and consumers of housing. UNHP also provided a critical 
dataset on Bronx housing that includes information about both quality and the sale or leveraging of 
individual buildings, which became the basis for quantitative and qualitative analyses that helped 
shape this research. 
This research relied heavily on internet tools for data-mining. First, financial transactions 
involving investors and buildings are overwhelmingly conducted through shell organizations, so 
identifying relationships between them requires some creative searching. Internet tools for pursuing 
this information include PropertyShark.com, a proprietary service that pulls current and historical 
documentation on individual buildings from public sources; the New York State Dept. of State’s 
Corporation and Business Entity Database; the NYC Dept. of Buildings’ online postings of permit 
applications (which provides permit applicant names and business addresses that can be cross-
referenced with de-identified information elsewhere) and the all-important Google.com search 
engine. 
Second, regulatory documentation on buildings is stored in “silos” that do not actively 
communicate with each other – for example, data on building violations collected by the NYC Dept. 
of Housing Preservation & Development (HPD) is stored online, but separately from data collected 
 124 
by the NYC Dept. of Buildings (DOB), and not compiled by building nor cross-checked by either 
agency. Data from the websites of HPD and DOB was compiled, cross-referenced and analyzed to 
generate more complete information about individual buildings. 
At the conclusion of data-gathering, the case study buildings and trends identified by 
interviewees were compared to findings on a 1% random sample of relevant buildings. The sample 
was subjected to the above data-mining techniques to assess possible physical risk to the building, 
milking/over-leveraging risk, and the extent to which the regulatory system was engaged with the 
building. 
These findings were clarified and supported by historical accounts of landlord-tenant 
relationships and the Bronx in particular, community-generated research reports, media reporting on 
local housing issues, a short interview with Father John Flynn, pastor of St. Martin of Tours parish 
in the Crotona section of the Bronx; and informal (but extremely informative) conversations with a 
leading US bank analyst, who is also my mother. 
 
